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Match-Specific Assets and 
Minority Oppression 
Edward B. Rock and Michael L. Wachter 
Closely held  corporations  (or “close corporations”)  form an important 
subset  of corporations  with  concentrated ownership.’ The category  in- 
cludes an interesting variety of enterprises, including the traditional “mom- 
and-pop’’ businesses, high-tech start-ups, and mature publicly held corpo- 
rations  post-leveraged  buyout.  More  generally, close corporations  are 
important because of their number and because even the largest publicly 
held corporations often started out as closely held corporations. As such, 
close corporations are incubators for tomorrow’s publicly held corpora- 
tions. 
Two sets of problems have arisen repeatedly in closely held corporations 
but only rarely in publicly held firms. The first, now resolved, revolved 
around the enforceability of attempts by  participants to tailor the terms 
set by  the general corporation law.  Because states historically have pro- 
vided one corporation law for all corporations, participants in closely held 
corporations have often tried to modify the statutory structure by contract 
to serve their needs. These variations raised the question of the extent to 
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1. Closely held corporations are typically defined as corporations for which  there is  no 
public market for shares and, sometimes, no market at all. An alternative and largely coex- 
tensive definition is  corporations with few (typically fewer than twenty-five) shareholders 
(see, e.g., American Law Institute 1994, sec. 1.06). 
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which parties can contract out of the rules provided by  the statute. The 
evolution toward greater flexibility was long and, at times, difficult, but 
flexibility is no longer a central issue. Today, participants in the close cor- 
poration can largely tailor its terms to their purposes. 
The second set of problems, and the focus of this paper, goes under the 
caption protection of  minority shareholders. To what extent should the law 
protect minority shareholders from “oppression” by majority sharehold- 
ers, beyond  what the parties have contracted for? This set of questions, 
unlike the first set, remains alive and controversial. It has been the subject 
of an enormous amount of judicial and legislative effort, much of which 
has been devoted to expanding the rights of minority shareholders. The 
questions raised,  however, go to the very core of what corporations are 
about. 
There are several repeated scenarios that raise the issue of minority op- 
pression. Consider the following: 
Case A. There is a falling out between  the majority  shareholder, Major, 
and the minority shareholder, Minor, both of whom work in the business. 
Major fires Minor, who then can either hold on to his shares, which pay 
no dividends (all distributions are through excessive salaries), or sell them 
back to the firm for whatever the majority shareholder is willing to offer. 
A variant  arises when there are three equal shareholders, A, B,  and C. 
After a falling out, A and B gang up on C and fire him, at which point he 
is left with shares that pay no dividends and that only the firm is willing 
to buy.2 
Case B. The majority shareholder or a group of shareholders enters into 
a transaction with the firm in which, for example, the firm buys back a 
portion of the majority shareholders’ shares, without making the opportu- 
nity  available to the minority  shareholder^.^  Easier variants of this sce- 
nario include the full range of transactions between controlling sharehold- 
ers and the firm,  including compensation,  selling/buying  property,  and 
diversion of corporate opportunitie~.~  More difficult variants include the 
situation in which the majority shareholder takes advantage of opportuni- 
ties that are not clearly corporate opportunities, such as developing a more 
liquid market for shares, in which the minority shareholders would like to 
participate but are not offered the ~pportunity.~ 
2. See, e.g.,  Wilkes v.  Springside Nursing Home, 353 N.E.2d 657 (Mass. 1976); and In re 
3. Classic examples are Donahue v.  Rodd Electrotype Co., 328 N.E.2d 505 (Mass. 1975): 
4. See, e.g., Croshy v.  Beam, 548 N.E.2d 217 (Ohio 1989); and Alaska Plastics L!  Coppock, 
5. Jones v. H. F  Ahmanson & Co., 460 P.2d 464 (Cal. 1969). 
Topper, 433 N.Y.S.2d 359 (Sup. Ct. 1980). 
and Nixon 1:  Blackwell, 626 A.2d 1366 (Del. 1993). 
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Case C.  The majority shareholder sells its majority (controlling) stake to 
a third party without giving the minority shareholder an opportunity to 
participate. 
This  paper  addresses  the  question  of  what,  if  anything,  the  courts 
should do for the minority shareholders in such cases when the parties 
have not provided for the problem by contract.6  Our basic answer is that 
the courts should not do anything except enforce the participants’ con- 
tracts and vigorously prevent non pro rata distributions to shareholders. 
This  second  principle  provides  a  guide  to  the expansion  of  minority- 
shareholder protection against oppre~sion.~ 
We  proceed as follows. First, we  make a fundamental break with the 
traditional legal treatment of the problem of minority oppression by re- 
jecting the analogy between close corporations and partnerships and the 
intuitions and implications that flow from it. We also show that the alter- 
native argument that emphasizes the low agency costs of close corpora- 
tions needs to be expanded to explain the Silicon Valley start-up-type close 
corporation. Second,  we  show that  the close corporation  form  is  best 
suited to companies that require extensive investments in match assets. In 
such cases, the close corporation acts as an incubator, and the lock-in is a 
benefit, not a cost. Low agency costs are more likely a result of the choice 
of form, not the reason that the form is adopted in the first instance. Third, 
we  argue that the problem of minority oppression combines two funda- 
mentally separate problems: the issue that, in the employment context, 
is raised by  the doctrine of “employment at will” and the quite separate 
problem of controlling shareholder attempts to make non pro rata distri- 
butions of firm assets. Building on an earlier analysis of employment at 
will, we  then show that the same norm of judicial nonintervention that 
governs the employment relationship solves closely similar problems in the 
close corporation  context. This norm, combined  with vigorous judicial 
enforcement of the rule of no non pro rata distributions, including ancil- 
lary enforcement of minority-shareholder information rights, and limita- 
tions on the ability of control shareholders to sell shares to the firm, allows 
the close corporation to maximize the value of its match assets. We close 
by drawing the implications of the analysis for a larger theory of close cor- 
porations. 
6. For a very interesting and important game-theoretic  analysis that arrives at many of the 
same points as we  do, but from a different direction, see Johnston (1992). Other important 
treatments that overlap with ours are Easterbrook and Fischel (1991) and O’Kelley (1992). 
7. There is a third problem that is not normally thought of as a close corporation prob- 
lem-namely,  “piercing the corporate veil.” This is the issue of when a creditor can pierce 
the corporate veil  of limited liability in  order to reach the assets of the shareholders. Al- 
though formally a question that arises in both publicly held and close corporations, in fact, 
in the United States, at least, the issue arises only in close corporations. It is, however, beyond 
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7.1  Defining the Issue 
There are two types of structures that fall under the heading close corpo- 
ration. One is the traditional close corporation, often small scale and fam- 
ily owned. The other is what we will call the Silicon Valley sturt-up.  * Several 
traits typically characterize the closely held firm: there are few sharehold- 
ers, no public market  for the shares, and a substantial overlap between 
suppliers of capital and suppliers of labor. Because of the overlap between 
managers and shareholders and the absence of public markets, the share- 
holder-managers of the close corporation  are in continuous contact with 
each other. Because of the lack of a public market, the parties are locked 
in to their investments to a much greater extent than in either the partner- 
ship or the publicly traded corporation. Since the majority  shareholders 
elect the directors and control the management of the corporation, minor- 
ity shareholders are particularly  vulnerable  if there is a falling out with 
the majority. 
7.1.1  Existing Positions 
In  a famous and influential article, John  Hetherington  and Michael 
Dooley (1977, 2) expressed the intuition that lies at the heart of the evolu- 
tion of minority shareholders’ remedies for oppression: that, in all impor- 
tant respects,  “the close corporation  is the functional equivalent  of the 
partner~hip.”~  On their view, participants choose the corporate form over 
the partnership form simply in order to take advantage of limited liability. 
The problem with close corporation law, they argue, is that, despite this 
functional  equivalence,  shareholders cannot exit  their  investment  with 
anything like the ease of partners, who always have the power to trigger a 
buyout by  dissolving the partnership “by the express will of any partner 
at any time.”’O To them, the difficulty of exit is a flaw in the legal structure. 
8. There is, now, a substantial literature on the structure and governance of venture capital 
start-ups (see Barry et al. 1990; Sahlman 1990; Gorman and Sahlman 1989; Lerner 1994, 
1995; and Gompers 1995). For a more comprehensive description of the “private equity” 
market, see Fenn, Liang, and Prowse (1995). 
9. For a classic judicial expression of the same intuition, see Donuhue v. Rodd Electrotype 
Co., 328 N.E.2d 505, 512 (Mass. 1975). 
10. Uniform Partnership Act, sec. 31(2). While the dissolution may be wrongful, it will 
nonetheless be eKective and will immediately trigger a winding up of partnership affairs, with 
the pro rata distribution of net proceeds. The Revised Uniform Partnership Act (1997),  in 
effect in some states, has tried to limit the potential damage to going concerns caused by this 
power, but individual partners retain much of their power to dissociate from the partnership 
and, by doing so, to trigger a buyout regime without triggering dissolution of the partnership 
itself. Thus, under secs. 601 and 602, a partner may dissociate from the partnership at will, 
at any time, rightly or wrongly. Under sec. 602(a), partners have the power to withdraw at 
any time, a power that  is  immutable under sec. 103(b)(6) (see the comment  to sec. 601). 
Under sec. 701, if a partner is dissociated from the partnership and the partnership contin- 
ues,  the partnership must buy out the dissociated partner’s interest for “the amount that 
would have been distributable to the dissociating partner . . . if, on the date of dissociation, 
the assets of the partnership were sold at a price equal to the greater of the liquidation value Match-Specific Assets and Minority Oppression  205 
Their proposed solution is legislation to provide shareholders of the close 
corporation the same exit option that partners have. 
Indeed, it is Hetherington and Dooley’s intuition that lies at the heart 
of the evolution of minority shareholders’ remedies for oppression. Al- 
though the law has not gone as far as they proposed, it has moved in that 
direction, driven, at least in significant measure, by an acceptance of their 
core claim of equivalence. Courts have been more willing to order dissolu- 
tion and buyouts when convinced that the majority has engaged in oppres- 
sive conduct and have been more willing to find oppressive conduct when 
the minority’s reasonable expectations have been violated. 
A literature has also developed that explores the conditions under which 
oppression, that is, opportunistic behavior, is likely to occur. This literature 
also provides support for buyouts and other remedies for minority oppres- 
sion (see, e.g., Thompson 1993; and Mahoney, chap. 6 in this volume). 
Frank Easterbrook and Daniel Fischel(l991, 228-52) have provided an 
alternative agency-cost argument. They argue that the limited number of 
shareholders and the overlap of managers and shareholders naturally align 
the interests of the two. This occurs for a variety of reasons. First, since 
managers are the largest residual claimants, actions taken by  them will 
directly affect the value of their investment. The alignment is strengthened 
when shareholders have a large percentage of their wealth tied up in the 
venture. And, since they cannot easily alienate their holdings, they will be 
focused on maximizing the return. Second, participants in close corpora- 
tions often have familial or other personal relationships.  The bond  be- 
tween them constrains conflicts of interest. The result of the close align- 
ment and the familial bond is that a close corporation can have very low 
agency costs. 
In  Easterbrook  and Fischel’s view,  companies choose the close cor- 
porate form in order to maximize the return on their low agency costs. 
If they wanted, they could either have adopted the partnership model, 
have contracted for shareholder agreements, or have adopted specific pro- 
tections for minority shareholders in the articles of incorporation. Con- 
sequently, those  who  choose the corporate  form without  modification 
should be assumed to prize stability of operations. The implications  of 
Easterbrook and Fischel’s approach to the minority-oppression debate is 
clear. Providing ease of dissolution or buyouts would only serve to weaken 
the bonds that align the parties’ interests. Consequently, controlling share- 
holders in close corporations should be held to the same fiduciary stan- 
dards as directors in publicly traded corporations, and no additional pro- 
tections should be accorded minority shareholders.” 
or the value based on a sale of the entire business as a going concern,” less any damages 
caused by wrongful dissolution. 
11. Easterbrook  and Fischel, on one side, and Hetherington  and Dooley, on the other, 
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But is Hetherington  and Dooley’s intuition correct? Are close corpora- 
tions nothing more than “incorporated partnerships”? Do close corpora- 
tions better serve the interests of the participants when exit is easy? Are 
Easterbrook and Fischel correct that the primary virtue of the close cor- 
poration  is that  it reduces  agency costs and  that  no additional protec- 
tion should be accorded minority shareholders? In order to answer these 
questions, we must place close corporations in a broader context, one that 
allows us to see that any explanation of the close corporate form must be 
able to explain the second type of close corporation:  the Silicon Valley 
start-up. 
7.1.2 
In Silicon Valley, close corporations are started when the entrepreneur 
has an idea for a new product or service, such as a network switch. In the 
initial stage, the venture attempts to develop the new product. Whether 
the product will be successful cannot be known since its precise form and 
potential revenue streams have not yet taken shape. At this stage, the com- 
pany will have relatively few shareholder-managers  who supply the ideas, 
the initial capital for the venture, or both. 
In the early stages of the development of this new switch, the venture is 
highly dependent on these individuals either for the critical product ideas 
or for the financial capital. Vulnerability  arises because the parties’ in- 
vestments are match specific. That is, the value of the investments is tied 
to the success of their unproved product. Were the product to be a success, 
the payoff to the investment would be huge. But, were the venture to be 
abandoned, the investment would  be lost. At a conceptual level, invest- 
ments  in  our hypothetical  network  switch  create  match  assets.  Match 
assets are those that have a value to the parties to the venture but little 
value to outsiders. We  use the terms match-specific assets, match assets, 
and match-specijic investments interchangeably.‘2 A defining characteristic 
of the Silicon Valley start-up is that its key assets are specific to the match. 
The intensity of match assets creates a second important characteristic 
of close corporations. Between the time of the initial investments in re- 
search, development, and marketing and the time at which the world can 
Our Position and the Silicon Valley Start-up 
courts faced with  allegations  of minority  oppression.  For example,  to Easterbrook  and 
Fischel, minority oppression is no more likely in the close than in the public corporation 
and should not be a cause of action with distinctive standards and remedies. 
12. Investments in match are defined to be investments that are more valuable to the con- 
tracting parties than to a third party. Wc use the term match-specrfic investment in this paper 
in place of the morc commonfirm-spwjfic truining for several reasons. First. the term match 
investment captures the broader range of activities that create a good partnership, including 
training and learning by doing but also including adaptations to each other’s styles of inter- 
action. In addition, the term is more general and does not restrain the investments to take 
place inside a firm or an industry. Finally, the term mutch spec@  leads one to identify the 
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see whether the switch will be a commercial success, it will be difficult to 
convince outsiders to  invest in the project. Second-stage venture capitalists 
can be interested in the venture but, given the still unproved value of the 
concept, will need to be brought in as insiders. The high cost of learning 
and staying  informed  about the switch’s potential  value makes  outside 
investors unwilling bidders at a price that values the match assets at the 
insiders’ valuation. As a consequence, the company will be capital con- 
strained with no easy access to outside financing at an appropriate valua- 
tion of the assets. 
If any of the company insiders could trigger dissolution of the enterprise 
midstream, the forced sale of the match assets would result in substantial 
losses to the participants. Either the insider with the deepest pocket would 
buy  the assets, or the assets would  be sold  at a low price equal to the 
outsiders’ bid price. If critical insiders could credibly threaten dissolution, 
they could use the threat to extract a great share of the value of the enter- 
prise. The resulting potential for opportunism would interfere with induc- 
ing optimal inve~tment.’~  The problem is akin to making an omelette: be- 
tween the time the eggs are broken and the time the omelette sets, the cook 
knows his grand plan for the omelette, but, to outsiders, the half-cooked 
omelette is unappetizing. Forced sales of half-developed switches and un- 
cooked omelettes go poorly. 
In our approach, low agency costs are a natural result of the choice of 
form but not the reason for adopting it. The close corporation will always 
have lower agency costs than an otherwise identical publicly owned com- 
pany as a consequence of the limited number of shareholders and the over- 
lap of shareholders and managers. But agency costs do not explain why 
any given firm would  adopt the close corporation form. The important 
exception, noted by Easterbrook and Fischel, is the family business. In a 
family business, low agency costs already exist in the familial relationship, 
and the parties can thus capitalize  on the relationship  by  adopting  the 
close corporation form. But the Silicon Valley start-up is different. These 
shareholder-managers  are unlikely  to have  preexisting  family  ties  and 
hence are unlikely to bring low agency costs to the formation of the close 
corporation. For at least the Silicon Valley start-up, the explanation  for 
the choice of form is an operational factor: the need  to lock in parties 
while developing vulnerable match-specific assets. Reduced agency costs 
are the result rather than the cause. 
The problem of match-specific investments in a context with substantial 
asymmetry of information  characterizes many other centrally important 
13.  Rent seeking, or, more generally, opportunism, can be defined as the expenditure of 
resources or effort by one party in order to transfer resources from the other party to itself. 
This investment by the rent payers wastes the joint profits of the parties because it creates 
no new wealth. Moreover, rent seeking by  one party typically causes the prospective rent 
payer to expend resources in order to protect its share of the joint investment. 208  Edward B. Rock and Michael L. Wachter 
economic  relationships. The employment  relationship  in  which  an em- 
ployee with match-specific training is more productive than an employee 
hired from the external labor market provides a classic example. That em- 
ployment relationship provides a critical foundation for our analysis pre- 
cisely because most  or all of the shareholders of close corporations are 
also employees. 
Focusing on match assets also shows the fundamental differences be- 
tween classic partnerships and close corporations. The dissolution-at-will 
feature of classic partnerships means that the form will best fit enterprises 
in which there are few, if any, assets that are not easily sold to third parties. 
In such cases, the benefits of dissolution  at will  are clear: by providing 
easy exit, it prevents opportunistic rent seeking. And the costs are mini- 
mal: when there are no sunk costs, when the principal  assets are easily 
divided or sold, dissolution at will causes little harm. Thus, for a small law 
firm in which partners have their own clients but wish to share office space 
and staff and occasionally to refer business to other lawyers in the office 
with greater expertise or receive referrals, the partnership form is optimal. 
If the firm breaks up one day, very little value is trapped. Indeed, as one 
would predict, small law partnerships dissolve and re-form constantly. 
But, if participants can trigger dissolution at will, they will be unwilling, 
ex ante, to make investments in match for fear that, ex post, they will be 
held up. Because of this, when there are high investments in match, such 
as with the Silicon Valley start-up, the costs of a rule of easy dissolution ex- 
plode. The traditional close corporation manifests the same features, al- 
though in a less highly articulated form. As in the Silicon Valley start-up, 
at the early stage of a new venture, the product or service will have no 
revenue but high costs. Similarly, once the initial investments of human 
and physical capital are made, the participants are locked in. In one re- 
spect,  the  traditional  family-business  close  corporation  poses  an even 
more difficult problem of protecting match investments. Unlike the Silicon 
Valley start-up, the traditional close corporation often expects to remain 
privately held indefinitely: the nature of the products or services is often 
such that selling to a third  party is never a live option. But traditional 
close corporations come in many forms, and, at least in their formative 
years, many often hope to develop a product or service that may eventu- 
ally be successful enough to be sold to a third party. 
Easy dissolution would also make it even more difficult to raise equity 
or debt capital than it already is. Were the firm required to retire the capi- 
tal of  an existing owner who  sought to cash out, the cash-constrained 
close corporation  would  be forced to raise  new capital in a potentially 
unfavorable climate. Indeed, the shareholder dissension that characterizes 
a minority-oppression  case is likely to be highly correlated with negative 
events in  the firm. A legal rule  favoring easy exit threatens to shift the Match-Specific Assets and Minority Oppression  209 
engine for raising new money into reverse, forcing capital to be retired 
under unfavorable conditions. 
Similarly, the lock-in of the corporate form is important to creditors. In 
a setting of limited liability, creditors cannot be repaid from the individual 
wealth of the owners of a bankrupt concern. In return, and in distinction 
to the rules of partnership, they are protected by the existence of an entity 
that is difficult for the current owners to dissolve. It is only with this pro- 
tection that the squabbles among those who manage the company will be 
of limited interest to the creditors. Nowhere is this more important than 
in  the close corporation, whose assets are difficult to value and whose 
current realizable market value-at  forced sale-may  be considerably be- 
low its future value. In such a setting, easy dissolution or buyout increases 
the risk of bankruptcy, thereby reducing the credit worthiness of the com- 
pany. The traditional judicial reluctance to order dissolution or a buyout 
of minority shareholders lowers the credit risk of close corporations and 
allows them to borrow at more favorable terms. 
Clearly, not all close corporations will be marked by heavy investments 
in match. Parties can and do choose alternative corporate and noncorpor- 
ate forms on the basis of very different motivations. In addition, parties 
sometimes make mistakes in their choice of form. In this regard, the anal- 
ysis can be interpreted as defining the paradigm close corporation that is 
best served by  the legal rules. Choose the close corporation  form when 
heavy investments in match make restrictions on exit valuable. Choose the 
partnership form when exit is not costly and the parties can be given free 
rein to withdraw from the match. 
7.2  Legal Setting 
In this section, we  describe the legal and nonlegal features of the close 
corporation.  In so doing, we  show how minority oppression arises and 
how it is constrained. This begins to set the stage for providing an answer 
to how the three cases noted at the outset should be resolved. 
7.2.1 
The standard, off-the-rack, corporate form provides a robust solution 
to the problem caused by threats of opportunistic exit. The standard form 
has  several relevant  terms.  Directors  are elected by  a  majority  of  the 
shares.14  Dissolution requires a board resolution and a vote of the majority 
of the share~.’~  Individual shareholders have no general right to sell their 
shares back to the firm. 
Core Solution: The Corporate Form 
14. See, e.g., Delaware General Corporation Law (Del. GCL), sec. 216. 
15. See, e.g., ibid., sec. 275. 210  Edward B. Rock and Michael L. Wachter 
The lock-in  of  the close corporation is created  by  the interaction  of 
these terms with the absence of a public market  for the shares. But the 
lock-in affects only the minority shareholder (Minor). The majority share- 
holder (Major) can dissolve thc corporation  through a board resolution 
and a vote of a majority of the shares. The individual minority sharehold- 
ers have no power to trigger dissolution.  Minor likewise has no right to 
be bought  out because, under the standard corporation  laws, no share- 
holder has a general right to be bought out. But, if  Major dissolves the 
corporation, Minor will receive his pro rata share if and when the firm is 
dissolved.Ih In the meantime, Minor has a very limited right to be bought 
out by the firm, namely, the right to judicial appraisal upon a merger and, 
sometimes, a sale of all or substantially all the assets.” 
In addition to the lock-in provided by the statutory form, there are addi- 
tional core properties of the form provided by  a combination of statute 
and case law. The single most important is the prohibition on non pro rata 
distributions during the life of the firm, combined with close scrutiny of 
self-dealing transactions that attempt  to evade this prohibition. The re- 
strictions on non pro rata  distributions are quite clear and derive from 
several sources. A majority shareholder may not pay itself dividends with- 
out also paying the same per share dividend to the minority shareholders.I8 
It would be clearly illegal--and  easily challenged --if  the majority share- 
holder paid itself $1 .OO per share in dividends while paying minority share- 
holders only $0.10 per share. 
Indirect means are also constrained. For example, if the majority share- 
holder attempts to divert assets by entering into a contract with the firm 
on preferential terms, the contract is subject to close judicial scrutiny, and 
the majority shareholder bears the burden of establishing that the trans- 
action is  “entirely  fair” to the corporation,  where entirely ,fair is.  when 
possible, defined by  an arm’s-length market comparison. Compensation 
agreements are subject to the same rule.’9  Generally, in order to avoid “en- 
tire fairness” scrutiny, compensation arrangements must be authorized in 
advance by disinterested directors or disinterested shareholders and, even 
then, are subject to scrutiny by the court under a “waste” standard. Simi- 
larly, attempts by  the majority shareholder to take opportunities that be- 
long to the corporation, or to use corporate assets for its own benefit, are 
limited  (again  imperfectly) by  the “corporate  opportunity” and related 
doctrines.20 
While no one believes that these rules eliminate non pro rata benefits of 
16. See, e.g., ibid., sec. 281. 
17. See, e.g., ibid., sec. 262; Revised  Model Business Corporation Act  (RMBCA), sec. 
18. Del. GCL, sec. 170; RMBCA, sec. 6.40. 
19. ALT  Principles of Corporate Governance. sec. 5.03 
20. Ibid., secs. 5.10-5.14. 
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control, most would agree that they do limit the magnitude of such diver- 
sion  significantly. Indeed,  as Clifford  Holderness  and Dennis  Sheehan 
(chap. 5 in this volume) show, empirical investigation suggests that legal 
restraints are surprisingly effective and probably the primary protection 
for minority shareholders. 
The centrality of these terms is clear: by limiting non pro rata distribu- 
tions, these provisions go a long way toward making the relationship in- 
centive compatible.  So long as the majority  shareholders cannot prefer 
themselves in distributions, minority shareholders can depend on the ma- 
jority to protect their, the minority’s, interests. 
A second set of standard protections is equally important in facilitating 
and protecting  the beneficial lock-in. These provisions address endgame 
scenarios. When, for example, the majority shareholder triggers dissolu- 
tion in order to take its capital out of the enterprise, the minority share- 
holders share pro rata in the net proceeds.21  Similarly, if the firm merges 
with another firm, shareholders receive equal shares, and minority share- 
holders have a right to be bought out at “fair value” whether the firm sur- 
vives or disappears.22  Under the Revised Model Business Corporation Act 
(RMBCA), minority shareholders are also entitled to appraisal if the firm 
sells all or substantially all of its assets. 
Attempts by  Major to circumvent  these rules  are constrained. If, for 
example, Major engineers a “squeeze-out merger” to rid itself of minority 
shareholders, Minor will be entitled to a judicial valuation  of its shares, 
often with favorable procedural protections. Under Delaware law, Minor 
will be entitled to appraisal.2’ In addition, Minor may also be entitled to 
bring a breach-of-fiduciary-duty  action.24  In evaluating such a squeeze- 
out merger, the Delaware court will place the burden on Major to prove 
the entire fairness of the price.2s 
7.2.2  Majority Opportunism and the Remedy for Minority Oppression 
But the very provisions that protect against opportunistic exit create the 
problem of opportunistic lock-in. Consider case A outlined above. When 
Major has a falling out with Minor and Minor is left holding a minority 
interest in a firm controlled by Major, the standard corporation codes do 
not give Minor any right to be bought  out or any right to dissolve the 
corporation. As a result, Minor may find itself locked into an investment 
that pays no dividends, in which Major makes all the decisions, and from 
which the only exit is to sell to Major at Major’s bid price. 
The core protection against majority  oppression is the prohibition  on 
21. See, e.g., Del. GCL, secs. 275, 281; RMBCA, secs. 14.02-14.05. 
22. Del. GCL, secs. 251,262; RMBCA, secs. 11.01-11.06,  13.01-13.02 
23. Del. GCL, sec. 262. 
24. Weinherger  v.  UOf Inc., 457 A.2d 701 (Del. 1983). 
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non pro rata distributions and the related  prohibitions  on self-dealing, 
discussed above. The doctrine of minority oppression can be understood 
as a supplemental judicial response to this problem. Over the last twenty- 
five years, in response to the perceived  plight  of the locked-in  minority 
shareholder, courts and legislatures have modified the law to provide reme- 
dies to minority shareholders not available to shareholders of publicly held 
corporations.26  This has been done in a variety of ways. First, legislatures 
in many states have broadened the circumstances in which minority share- 
holders may force the judicial dissolution  of a corporation. In addition, 
legislatures  have  expanded  the  range  of  remedies  beyond  dissolution, 
namely, to include judicially mandated buybacks at a fair price. In most 
jurisdictions, shareholders can petition for dissolution on the grounds of 
illegality, fraud, misapplication of assets, or waste. Oppressive conduct by 
the majority shareholder is often listed as a basis for dissol~tion.~’  Simi- 
larly, frustration of shareholders’ reasonable expectations is often a ground 
for dissolution (Thompson 1988). In other  jurisdictions, shareholders’ rea- 
sonable expectations are the measure of whether the majority shareholder 
has oppressed the minority. 
Second, judges have become more willing to order dissolution or a buy- 
out, particularly if they are convinced that majority shareholders have en- 
gaged in oppressive conduct or that shareholders’ reasonable expectations 
have been violated. 
Third, courts have made it easier, substantively and procedurally,  for 
minority  shareholders  to bring  suit  against  majority  shareholders  for 
breach of fiduciary duties. Minority shareholders have benefited from sev- 
eral trends. First, courts have demonstrated a tendency to make stricter 
the fiduciary duty owed by  majority  shareholders.  Second, courts have 
shown an increased  skepticism toward whether the majority has fulfilled 
its duties. Finally, courts have broadened the situations in which a minor- 
ity shareholder can bring a (procedurally simple) direct suit in place of a 
(procedurally complex) derivative suit. Together, these developments have 
moved close corporation law toward partnership law, both with regard to 
the ease of dissolution and with regard to the duties owed by one share- 
holder to the others. 
These various doctrines have proved difficult to contract out of (Oest- 
26. In the following, extremely cursory summary, we  follow  the excellent  treatment in 
Thompson (1993).  For further details, see Thompson (1988).  For even  more details, see 
O’Neal and Thompson (1985, [I9861 1995). 
27. See, e.g., RMBCA, sec. 14.30(2)(ii): “The court may dissolve a corporation . . . in a 
proceeding by  a shareholder if it is established that . . . the directors or those in control of 
the corporation have acted, are acting, or will act in a manner that is illegal, oppressive, or 
fraudulent.” Under sec. 14.34(a), when shares are closely held, “the corporation may elect, 
or, if it fails to elect, one or more of the shareholders may elect to purchase all shares owned 
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erle 1995).  Because the doctrines find their foundation in either a contrac- 
tual covenant  of good faith or a fiduciary duty, and because contracts 
waiving such duties are typically void, a straightforward contractual opt- 
out will not be effective. Similarly, contractual attempts to divest courts of 
authority to dissolve the corporation are generally void. Ironically, while 
the overwhelming trend in close corporation law has been to permit tai- 
loring of the standard terms by contract, the area of minority protection 
has stood out as an exception. 
In summary, then, a cause of action has evolved for shareholder oppres- 
sion or, perhaps more accurately, as Robert Thompson (1993, 708) sug- 
gests, for “shareholders’ dissension.” This cause of action has increased 
the ability of shareholders of the close corporation to turn to a third-party 
decision maker for relief from what that shareholder argues is oppression 
or unfair conduct by the controlling shareholders. Although the cause of 
action is still evolving and its boundaries remain obscure, these develop- 
ments have increased the bargaining power of the minority, ex post, vis-a- 
vis the majority. 
The critical question is whether such developments are likely to benefit 
the participants in close corporations. Our point is that the close corpora- 
tion is the ideal form for enterprises with a high density of match assets 
because of, and not despite, its lock-in feature. Accordingly, the develop- 
ment of shareholder-oppression law may interfere with the efficiency of 
the close corporation  form. To  reduce  this possibility, what  principles 
should guide its evolution? 
7.2.3 
The possibility of  opportunistic  behavior  does not, itself, provide  a 
sufficient basis for judicial or legal intervention. While the problem  of 
opportunism is pervasive in relationships characterized by investments in 
match and asymmetry of information, only sometimes are such problems 
solved by  legal intervention. To  put it somewhat differently, the issue is 
when a non-legally enforceable norm-governed relationship serves the par- 
ties’ interests better than a third-party law-governed relationship. 
From this perspective, one cannot understand the role of legal interven- 
tion in the close corporation until one first understands the extent to which 
the relationship is already self-governed by non-legally  enforceable norms 
enabled by the core legal form. We proceed in several steps. First, because 
many minority-oppression cases are employment related and the employ- 
ment relationship is the best example of a relationship with match invest- 
ments and asymmetric information that is almost entirely norm governed, 
we start with a brief summary of that analysis. Second, we apply that mode 
of analysis to the close corporation, examining the analogous non-legally 
enforceable structures that constrain opportunistic  behavior. Third, we 
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examine the fundamental  legal protections that make possible that self- 
government. With that groundwork laid. we then turn to the appropriate 
judicial role in rooting out residual opportunism. 
7.3  Constraints on Opportunism 
7.3.1  The Employment Relationship and Investments in Match 
The employment relationship and, particularly, the relationship between 
managers  and the  firm  is  often  characterized  by  large  investments  in 
match.28  These include employee investments in identifying the employer, 
in understanding and improving job performance, and in learning the or- 
ganizational and operating structures of the company and its core com- 
petencies. The company, in turn, invests in identifying and training  the 
employee in the factors listed above and in monitoring the employee’s per- 
formance to determine the most profitable future path of joint match in- 
vestments.  Many of these investments are match  specific and would  be 
lost if the employee left the company. 
Given the magnitude of the sunk investments in match, the threshold 
question is why the parties enter an ongoing relationship without adopting 
(legally enforceable) contract terms to protect their interests. The explana- 
tion is twofold. First, contracting over the multitude of interactions would 
be extremely costly in a relationship that is continuous and evolving. Sec- 
ond, self-enforcing but non-legally  enforceable norms emerge to constrain 
opportunistic behavior. 
The widespread but puzzling features of the employment relationship 
can be best understood as a remarkably robust set of self-enforcing em- 
ployee protections. Consider, for example, why firms choose to discharge 
an employee for inferior performance rather than adopting a less severe 
penalty,  such as reduction  in wages. While this may initially seem to be 
in conflict with the presumed  interest  of the parties  in maintaining the 
employment  relationship,  asymmetric  information  requires  termination 
rather than  a wage reduction. Because  of asymmetric information, em- 
ployees know their work effort, but firms do  not. Firms can learn by moni- 
toring, but constant monitoring is very costly. To save on costs, workers 
are infrequently monitored. The harsh penalty is driven by the low detec- 
tion rate. If most shirking goes undetected, workers must be penalized an 
amount greater than the expected loss of any specific incident. 
But this optimal deterrence explanation does not explain why the pen- 
alty for inferior performance cannot be a large salary reduction. The an- 
swer is that, if the firm could simply declare that an employee was under- 
28. For a fuller analysis, see Rock and Wachter (1996) and, more generally, Wachter and 
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performing and cut his salary, the employer would have an incentive to 
overstate underperformance, thereby reducing costs and increasing prof- 
its. Channeling the employer’s response into discharge is thus incentive 
compatible. In declaring inferior performance, the company must accept 
the loss of the employee. The company is willing to do this if the employ- 
ee’s performance is indeed inferior, but not otherwise. The practice of lay- 
ing off  workers during a slowdown, rather than reducing wages, can be 
understood in a similar fashion. 
From this perspective, the legal doctrine of employment at will-the 
doctrine according to which companies can discharge employees for good 
reasons, bad reasons, or no reason at all-is  best understood as a rule of 
judicial nonintervention, not the incorporation of a substantive norm of 
the employment relation~hip.~~  Even the critics of the rule do not claim 
that  companies often discharge workers for bad  reasons or no reason. 
Why, when the substantive norm that governs the employment relation- 
ship seems to be no discharge without cause, would the parties prefer a 
legal rule that says no intervention? The answer follows from the preced- 
ing analysis. 
An enforceable contract must be specified ex ante in terms that can be 
verified ex post by the third-party enforcer. In the employment context of 
continuous and evolving interactions, such a contract would invariably be 
incomplete. Consequently, the expectations of the parties would be diffi- 
cult to establish at any given point in time. Since much of the information 
is asymmetrically available to one party, many of the outcomes cannot be 
verified by third parties. 
In this context, legal enforcement of the norm of no discharge without 
cause would undermine the norm-based system because of the difficulties 
of ex post third-party verification. As a starting point, proving just cause 
would  require  that  the employer engage in  additional  detection  costs, 
which reduces the value of the match. In addition, the third party would 
have to learn enough about the internal norms of the firm to determine 
whether a violation  of  the norm was  meaningful  enough to constitute 
cause. Moreover, the presence of investments in match increases the likeli- 
hood of error when third parties enforce the norms because the valuations 
of those assets depend, not on market prices, but on the parties’ own valu- 
ations. From the employer’s perspective, just cause exists when the contin- 
uation of the match with the particular employee has negative net present 
value, including the reputational cost of taking too tough or too easy a 
stance in the face of the perceived violation. 
Self-enforcing norms better  serve the parties’  interests.  On  the  one 
hand, they allow the party with the detailed information to act on his or 
her knowledge at low cost. At the same time, they protect the uninformed 
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party by forcing the informed party’s actions into channels that make op- 
portunistic behavior unprofitable. 
In cases where norms are insufficient to deter opportunistic behavior, 
other, nonlegal remedies are available. The parties are involved in repeti- 
tive interactions, and the employer is also a repeat player in the competi- 
tive external labor markets. Both make it costly for an employer to act op- 
portunistically.  In the ongoing employment relationship, bad play by  the 
employer generates retributive bad play by the employees, whether in con- 
cert or individually. This can take the form of hard-to-detect work slow- 
downs, bad-mouthing the employer in the public domain, or even covert 
vandalism and theft. Such actions cause direct losses to the employer and 
force an increase in monitoring, which is also costly. In the labor market 
for new employees, a reputation for bad play is similarly costly in the form 
of increased difficulty attracting or retaining the best employees. Finally, 
in the case of nonsupervisory employees, unionization is an effective alter- 
native,  forcing the relationship  into the domain of  explicit contracting 
with a collective-bargaining agreement. 
Given these advantages, the resilience of the employment-at-will doc- 
trine in the employment relationship is not surprising. Whenever courts 
encroach on the doctrine through a theory of contractual interpretation, 
one finds that, to the extent permitted,  the parties contract  around the 
interpretation by specifying, for example,  that the terms of the employ- 
ment handbook are not to be taken as legally binding. The best explana- 
tion  for this resilience is that, in a relationship  characterized  by  match 
investments and asymmetry of information, the parties are best served by 
self-enforcing rather than third-party enforced agreements.  It is not that 
opportunistic behavior is eliminated entirely, only that the benefits of the 
flexible norm-governed relationship outweigh the costs of residual oppor- 
tunism. 
We  now turn to the analogous problem in the closely held corporation. 
7.3.2  Close Corporation: Nonlegal Constraints on Opportunism 
As in the employment context, many  of the persistent  features of the 
close corporation provide substantial, albeit non-legally  enforceable, pro- 
tection  against opportunities  for abuse that are opened up by the form 
itself. In this subsection, we  explore how these nonlegal constraints op- 
erate and show that the seemingly detrimental lock-in  of the close cor- 
poration, supplemented by the prohibition on direct and indirect non pro 
rata distributions, renders the form largely incentive compatible. By  lock- 
ing in Major and prohibiting  non pro rata payments,  Major will maxi- 
mize Minor’s stake in seeking to maximize the value of his own stake in 
the firm. 
This is particularly true in the case in which the close corporation is like 
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ger dissolution, the lack of a market prevents exit or opportunistic threats 
of exit, except under narrowly defined circumstances. Locked in together, 
the parties can count on each other’s dedication to cooking the omelette 
properly. This issue is also handled, at least in the Silicon Valley start-up, by 
legally enforceable contracts that protect early investors through particu- 
lar financing structures (Sahlman 1990; Gompers 1995). In general, then, 
the close corporation forces the investor into a high degree of illiquidity, 
an unfavorable state from a traditional investment perspective, but an illi- 
quidity that serves the interests of the parties by locking up participants 
in the enterprise. 
A variety of other features of the close corporation can be understood 
as supplementing and complementing this structure. The overlap between 
suppliers of capital and labor reduces information asymmetries and trans- 
action costs. Whether in the traditional or the Silicon Valley variety, the 
overlap puts all the relevant players into continuing contact, providing 
both the entrepreneur and the capital suppliers with continuing informa- 
tion on their own and on the company’s performance. 
The result is that the operations of the close corporation are akin to the 
stylized employment relationship discussed above. The same types of self- 
enforcing norms are operational. In both cases, the participants are en- 
gaged in repetitive interactions where the parties can sanction each other 
for bad play and can apply the appropriate sanctions more reliably than 
third parties who cannot observe and monitor the behavior of the parties. 
In  the close corporation, the ability of the participants  to identify im- 
proper behavior will  be much greater than the ability of any third party. 
Moreover, the ability of the participants to punish bad behavior will like- 
wise  be  great. The  disenchanted  minority  shareholder-manager  armed 
with greater access to company-performance information has more lever- 
age to sanction bad play by the employer than does the individual manager 
in a public corporation. 
Indeed, if  anything, the results found in the employment relationship 
are stronger in the case of the close corporation because of Easterbrook 
and Fischel’s point on agency costs. The most difficult problem in the em- 
ployment relationship is aligning the interests of the employees with those 
of the company. Pay for performance, particularly, stock options for senior 
executives, reduces the misalignment in the public company, but the device 
is costly to the shareholders and imperfect. In the close corporation, pay 
for performance is  a natural result  of the fact that employees are also 
shareholders. More generally, in the public corporation’s employment rela- 
tionship, senior executives and shareholders occupy mostly independent 
spheres. In the close corporation, the spheres overlap. The wide gover- 
nance mandate of its board of directors results from the overlap of roles 
between capital and labor providers. The shareholder-employee is involved 
in the governance issues normally reserved for shareholders (in the pub- 218  Edward B. Rock and Michael L. Wachter 
licly held  corporation)  and for employees (in the employment  relation- 
ship). 
The robustness  of the norm protection is illustrated by  the high-tech 
sector. The occasions for opportunistic renegotiation  that arise from se- 
quential performance are a particular problem in high-tech start-ups. Ven- 
ture capitalists (VCs) worry that, after accepting early financing from the 
VC,  the entrepreneurs will find other financing once the idea proves its 
worth or will  quit and go to work  elsewhere after the VC  has invested 
millions of dollars. Entrepreneurs worry that the VCs will find other man- 
agers once the idea has been committed to paper and has proved its worth. 
These concerns, which are simply a special and detailed case of the more 
general problems of the close corporation, are the subject of intense con- 
tracting (and research). We  illustrate by considering a few details. 
The VCs protect themselves in several ways3”  First, a surprising stylized 
fact of the Silicon Valley start-up is that the VCs have the right to replace 
the entrepreneur with a professional manager (Hellmann 1998). In addi- 
tion, the terminated entrepreneur can often be forced to sell his stock back 
to the firm at cost, which will be well below its actual value. Finally, entre- 
preneurs do not automatically receive generous severance packages. 
Thomas Hellmann  (1998) explains why  the VCs would  demand such 
terms as a response to a holdup problem. Entrepreneurs gain private ben- 
efits of control, which lead them to stay on longer than they should. By 
contrast,  the VCs’ incentives  are much  better  aligned with  maximizing 
firm value, and, moreover, they are better situated to identify better pro- 
fessional managers. In Hellmann’s model, unless the VC receives the right 
to displace the entrepreneur,  it will not invest optimally in searching for 
replacement managers. 
How the entrepreneurs protect themselves is equally interesting. After 
all, if the VC has the right to terminate the entrepreneur, which triggers a 
stock buyback at cost, there would seem to be an incentive to do so. The 
entrepreneur’s protections here are entirely nonlegal, but they are substan- 
tial. Most important, VCs are repeat players in the start-up business and 
are likely to be constrained on a number of fronts. First, they compete to 
provide financing for the most promising start-ups and are thus likely to 
be Constrained by reputational effects in their aim to maintain their posi- 
tion in relation to other start-up companies.  In addition, the VC  has to 
replace the entrepreneur with another person. Wrongful discharge of the 
CEO, even if protected from judicial second-guessing by the employment- 
at-will doctrine, is not a strong starting point in any recruitment process. 
30. For further discussion of the provisions in this paragraph, see Fenn, Liang, and Prowse 
(1995, 32-33),  Barry et al. (1990), Gorman and Sahlman (1989). Gompers (1995), and Ler- 
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Finally, the discharge will raise questions with other capital suppliers. It is 
a negative signal under the best of circumstances and is likely to raise the 
company’s cost of capital. This, of  course, is precisely the story we  told 
about employment at will more generally, and the fact that employment 
at will governs even in a domain of such intensive contracting as the Sili- 
con Valley high-tech sector is further support for our analysis. 
That still leaves open the question of why the entrepreneur’s stock posi- 
tion can be bought out at cost. The likely answer here, as stressed through- 
out the paper, is the difficulty of determining market value for a start-up 
company that does not trade in a public market. The contract term that 
sets the buyback price at cost, however, is a default  setting. Here again, 
the VC  will have a strong reputational incentive to deal fairly with the 
discharged entrepreneur, including paying  a higher  price  if  that can be 
reliably determined. 
Another feature that is particularly striking is the absence of any general 
right to trigger dissolution or to be bought out at a pro rata share of firm 
value. The choice made in the high-tech sector, where contracting is most 
explicit, is to leave the lock-in in place and to avoid judicial valuation of 
hard-to-value assets, even at the cost of  some residual opportunism. This 
is consistent with the more general reactions to the special close corpora- 
tion chapters of corporation codes, promulgated by some jurisdictions in 
response to developments in the law and academic commentary: few firms 
avail themselves of the opportunity to organize under such statutes. On 
the contrary, close corporations seem stubbornly to adhere to organizing 
under the general corporation codes. 
7.4  The Proper Judicial Role in the Three Cases 
We  have argued that  the lock-in  effect of the corporate form is what 
makes it so attractive for firms that benefit from extensive investments in 
match. We have argued further that there are a variety of structural fea- 
tures that limit the incentives and constrain the ability of the participants 
to act opportunistically, the principal threat to optimal match investment. 
In addition, the law  limits significantly the non pro rata distribution of 
assets from the corporation and provides for pro rata treatment on disso- 
lution and merger. Moreover, the law provides for a judicial valuation of 
minority shares in a sharply limited number of situations. Finally, partici- 
pants are free to contract for additional or different terms, an opportunity 
that participants liberally use. 
The remaining question is what room, if any, is there for further  judicial 
intervention on behalf of minority shareholders? The worry is that judicial 
attempts to protect minority shareholders against opportunistic behavior 
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corporation form  so  attractive  and  popular  for firms with  substantial 
match-specific assets.)’ In guarding further against the potential for mi- 
nority oppression, do we end up increasing the potential for opportunism 
in the relationship by providing Minor with more chances to act opportu- 
nistically against Major? 
7.4.1 
Consider case A, in which Major fires Minor. Minor, the terminated 
minority shareholder who invested in match-specific assets related  to a 
new network switch, had the expectation that he would share in the returns 
generated from the venture. We worry that Minor will not be able to share 
the fruit of his efforts now that he has had a falling out with fellow share- 
holder Major. Moreover, we  worry that, having lost his job, Minor will 
be forced by  economic necessity, and the absence of a liquid market for 
shares, to sell his shares at a fraction of the pro rata value of the firm. The 
Minors of the world, we worry, never being sure whether they will end up 
on the wrong end of a disagreement, will not invest optimally in match- 
specific assets unless their employment and investment expectations are 
protected. 
There are two variants of case A that must be considered. First, assume 
that Major is the entrepreneur who supplies the ideas and has 60 percent 
of the stock and that Minor supplies the money and has 40 percent. What 
possibilities for opportunism arise in the absence of any special protection 
for minority  shareholders? Suppose that,  after  Minor has  invested his 
money and the idea is developing well, Major says, “I want an additional 
10 percent of the equity, or else you will never see a dime of profit,” or any 
number of variants that amount to the same thing. Is this a credible threat? 
Clearly, the answer is no. First, because of the restrictions on non pro rata 
distributions, if  Minor does not get any dividends, neither does Major. 
Second, if Minor is providing more than money (management advice, in- 
dustry contacts, etc.), Major may still need him. Third, the market and 
the need for a stream of additional capital will constrain Major’s ability 
to threaten Minor. In these circumstances, Minor will be unwilling to put 
more capital into the business. Other potential investors are likely to refuse 
as well as soon as they learn of the incident. As long as Minor remains a 
material owner of the company or is known in the financial community, 
those in  the financial community who are considering investments will 
undoubtedly  learn  of  Major’s opportunism. Empirical research  on the 
Case A: Employment at Will as Minority Oppression? 
31. A weaker proposal would be to make the minority protection a default setting, from 
which firms could opt out. The experience of states that have special optional close corpora- 
tion provisions suggests that there would be boilerplate opt-out of default settings. The wide- 
spread contracting around departures from the employment-at-will doctrine through the in- 
terpretation of employee handbooks likewise suggests that any variation would have to be 
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high-tech sector confirms that the financial people are quite good at con- 
tracting for particular sorts of devices to protect against this sort of oppor- 
tunism. 
Consider, now,  the reverse scenario: Major supplies the financial re- 
sources and holds 60 percent, while Minor is the entrepreneur who sup- 
plies the ideas and has 40 percent. Once Minor commits his idea to pat- 
entable  paper,  Major fires  Minor.  Minor has  neither  an employment 
agreement nor any shareholders’ agreement  that provides  for a buyout 
right. Does Minor have a claim on our sympathies? 
In this case, a threshold question  is whether  Minor’s contribution  is 
“one off.” If it is, then Minor opens himself to opportunistic renegotiation 
if Minor commits the contribution before Major finishes performing. But, 
when the contribution really is one off, without the necessity for ongoing 
involvement (the scenario that gives rise to the threat of opportunism), 
there is an easy transactional solution: a license or sale. The person  (or 
persons) who discovers something important but has nothing further to 
contribute should license or sell the idea to Major, who will then develop 
it. Similarly, when  the capital provider  has only  a  single investment  to 
make and has nothing else to contribute, he should buy limited partner- 
ship shares with  a VC  who can then  control the opportunistic  Majors 
because of his superior knowledge and network. Of course, the onetime, 
would-be financier may purchase the patent or license it, only to go broke 
owing to his own lack of good follow-up ideas. The critical fact, however, 
is the following: when the contribution is, indeed, one off, there is no busi- 
ness reason to use the corporate form at all. 
Focus, then, on the difficult cases that will involve plaintiffs who believe 
that they are still making contributions to the firm. If brought before a 
third party for resolution, Major will explain that Minor was fired because 
Minor has been shirking or is not suited to the current demands of his 
job or needs of the firm. That is, Minor is no longer making a valuable 
contribution. Minor will maintain that he was fired because Major wanted 
to take Minor’s ideas for himself and capture all the gains. 
This is precisely the same problem that is addressed in employment law 
by the employment-at-will doctrine. Sorting out the truth, here, raises pre- 
cisely the difficulties of relying on a third party  to resolve employment 
disputes. It is very difficult for the court to determine ex  post what the 
parties’ reasonable expectations were ex ante. Even if the court could de- 
termine the parties’ expectations, performance is largely unobservable, so 
the court will be unable to determine whether the expectations have been 
satisfied. As in the employment context, Major and Minor know much 
more about who is telling  the truth than a judge can ever discover. In 
addition, valuing the relationship-specific assets to determine whether op- 
portunism  has occurred  and, if  so, to set damages is,  in theory and in 
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pression or breach of reasonable expectations will, as in the employment 
context, undermine the web of self-enforcing relationships that provides 
the principal protection for investments in match. 
Against  this background,  consider  the classic case A case,  Wilkes v. 
Springside Nursing Home.32  Wilkes, along with three others, established a 
nursing home, with the work and profits apportioned more or less equally. 
After a falling out, the others forced Wilkes out of active participation in 
the management  of  the enterprise  and cut off  all corporate payments. 
Wilkes alleged that his termination constituted a breach of the fiduciary 
duties owed him by the majority  shareholders. According  to the court, 
“The severance of Wilkes from the payroll resulted not from misconduct 
or neglect of duties, but because of the personal desire of [the other share- 
holders] to prevent him from continuing to receive money from the corpo- 
ration .” 
In holding for Wilkes, the court stated: 
A guaranty of employment with the corporation may have been one of 
the “basic reason[s] why  a minority  owner has invested capital in the 
firm.” . . . The minority stockholder typically depends on his salary as 
the principal  return on his investment, since the “earnings of a close 
corporation  . . . are distributed in major part in salaries, bonuses and 
retirement  benefits.” . . . Other noneconomic interests of the minority 
stockholder are likewise injuriously affected by barring him from corpo- 
rate  office. . . . Such  action  severely restricts  his  participation  in  the 
management of the enterprise and he is relegated to enjoying those ben- 
efits incident to his status as a stockholder. . . . In sum, by  terminating 
a minority shareholder’s employment or by severing him from a posi- 
tion as an officer or director, the majority effectively frustrate the minor- 
ity stockholder’s purposes in entering on the corporate venture and also 
deny him an equal return on his investment. 
That said, the court recognized the extent to which the controlling group 
needed “room to maneuver in establishing the business policy of the cor- 
poration.” As a compromise, the court established a “legitimate business 
purpose” test: “When an asserted business purpose for their action is ad- 
vanced by the majority, . . .  we think it is open to minority stockholders to 
demonstrate that the same legitimate objective could have been achieved 
though an alternative course of action less harmful to the minority’s inter- 
est.” Because the majority had not shown a legitimate business purpose in 
terminating Wilkes’s involvement in the firm, the court held for Wilkes. 
There is, in addition, a second argument suggested that raises some ad- 
ditional issues. The court notes, “Other noneconomic interests of the mi- 
nority stockholder are likewise injuriously affected by  barring him from 
corporate office. . . . Such action severely restricts his participation in the 
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management of the enterprise and he is relegated to enjoying those bene- 
fits incident to his status as a stockholder.” The exact thrust of the court’s 
argument here is somewhat unclear. One reading of this claim is that there 
are valuable, noneconomic benefits that come with participation in the 
firm. To  the extent that this is the argument, it simply amplifies the no- 
just-cause claim. 
But there is a much more relevant alternative reading, namely, that ter- 
minating Wilkes’s participation in the firm made it impossible for him to 
continue to monitor his coshareholders and that, because of the asymme- 
try of information that characterizes the close corporation form, this ren- 
ders his continued participation  as a shareholder untenable. This is an 
argument that differs both from the faulty employment-at-will concerns 
and from the non pro rata distribution concerns discussed below. 
Could the other shareholders in Wilkes have been behaving opportunis- 
tically? Could they have terminated Wilkes’s relationship with the firm in 
order to expropriate his investment now that he had already committed 
whatever special skills and knowledge he had? Absolutely. Opportunistic 
behavior is clearly possible in such circumstances. But that, alone, is not 
sufficient to justify the court’s response, namely, a case-by-case analysis of 
termination to see whether the firm acted with “legitimate business pur- 
pose” and with no “less harmful alternative.” That is the same as saying 
that, because opportunistic behavior is possible in the employment rela- 
tionship, a court should scrutinize each termination to see if  it was for 
just cause.33 
Case A and Wilkes both present situations in which the majority share- 
holder or shareholders could be behaving opportunistically. But, in both 
cases, there are numerous nonlegal constraints on such behavior. If Major 
treats Minor badly, Major will have greater difficulty convincing current 
shareholder-employees to continue investing time, money, and effort in the 
enterprise and convincing prospective investors or prospective employees 
to join the firm on the same terms as Minor did. These are the reputation 
and self-help stories described earlier. 
But suppose that Minor’s idea or Wilkes’s stake is so valuable that Ma- 
jor is willing to suffer whatever reputational cost it will  incur by  acting 
badly? Minor and Wilkes are still not unprotected. If Major successfully 
markets or develops Minor’s patent or sells it, or if Springside Nursing 
Homes sells the nursing home to a national chain, Minor and Wilkes are 
still protected by the rule of no non pro rata distributions. If Major ulti- 
mately decides to liquidate or sell the firm in order to take its profits on 
Minor’s invention, Minor will likewise receive his share. In the meantime, 
Minor will  be in  a position to make Major’s life difficult with requests 
33. This, of course, is precisely the argument that opponents of the employment-at-will 
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for information and threats of litigation. Finally, if these protections are 
insufficient and the problem is significant, future Minors always have the 
option of specifying additional protections by contract. 
On the other side of the equation, to permit judicial scrutiny of Minor’s 
or Wilkes’s termination is to undermine the very advantages of the infor- 
mal, non-legally  enforceable set of protections that constitute relational 
“contracts.” As we  have argued elsewhere (Rock and Wdchter  1996) in 
connection with the employment-at-will doctrine, the attempt to root out 
residual opportunism-opportunism  that slips through the network of le- 
gal and nonlegal constraints-threatens  to undermine the self-enforcing 
character of the overall relationship. Moreover, as we discuss in more de- 
tail below, the court’s difficulties determining whether a discharge was for 
a “legitimate business purpose” are aggravated by the difficulties of valu- 
ing match assets in awarding Minor the “fair value” of his shares in a ju- 
dicially mandated buyout. 
The Wilkes case is a good example of the difficulties that courts have 
with  the  employment  issues  that  frequently  overlay  close  corporation 
cases.34  For example,  was the court correct in saying that there was no 
legitimate business purpose in terminating Wilkes’s employment? On the 
one hand, we are told that there was no misconduct and that Wilkes “had 
always accomplished his assigned  share of the duties competently.” The 
court, however, made no attempt to determine whether Wilkes’s services 
were still needed. Apparently, he was not replaced, suggesting overstaffing. 
By not appreciating the norms of the employment relationship, the court 
stumbled badly, inferring a right to continued employment subject only to 
proof of misconduct. Such a right is so at variance with employment prac- 
tice anywhere that its insertion in the case undermines the logical applica- 
tion of the legitimate-business-purpose standard. 
7.4.2  Case B: Stock Buybacks as Minority Oppression? 
Consider, now, case B: Major forces the firm to buy back a portion of 
Major’s shares (but leaving Major in control) at an entirely fair price, with- 
out giving Minor a proportionally equal opportunity  to cash out. The 
principal variant of case B is where Major Group, the controlling share- 
holder group, buys back the shares of one of the control group without 
giving Minor a proportionally equal opportunity  to cash out. In either 
case, does Minor have a claim on our sympathies? Here, we  worry that, 
even if his transaction with the firm meets the entire fairness valuation 
standard, Major gets a benefit that Minor does not: the ability to  cash out 
a portion of his holdings when doing so is profitable. We worry that Ma- 
jor’s ability to “have his cake and eat it too” will undermine Minor’s incen- 
34. The importance of employment disputes and the employment-at-will doctrine in the 
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tive to invest optimally in the firm by breaking the beneficial lock-in fea- 
ture of the corporate form. 
This is the issue in Donahue  v. Rodd Electrotype.  35 In Donahue, the con- 
trolling shareholder, Dad, distributed most of  his shares to his children 
who worked in the business. Subsequently, his sons wished that Dad would 
retire, and he was agreeable, but he would do so only if he could sell some 
of his remaining shares back to the firm (with the remainder distributed 
later to his sons). The firm bought back Dad’s shares without offering an 
equal opportunity to the minority shareholders, who challenged this as a 
breach of fiduciary duty. After a lengthy discussion of the extent to which 
close corporations are really little more than incorporated partnerships, 
a discussion that is not only wrong but unnecessary to the decision of 
the case, the Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts held: “If the stock- 
holder  whose shares were  purchased  was a member  of the controlling 
group, the controlling stockholders must cause the corporation to offer 
each stockholder an equal opportunity to sell a ratable number  of his 
shares to the corporation at an identical price.” 
Nixon  v.  Blackwell  likewise  involved  a  stock-repurchase  plan.36 In 
Nixon, the firm established an ESOP (employee stock-option plan) that 
held company stock and provided departing shareholder-employees with 
the right to receive cash for their interest in the ESOP when they retired. 
In addition, the company established key-man insurance policies that al- 
lowed proceeds from the plan to be used to purchase stock in executives’ 
estates. The nonemployee minority shareholders objected on the grounds 
that they were not provided an equal opportunity to sell their shares. The 
Chancery Court held that it was “inherently unfair” for the controlling 
shareholders to provide liquidity for themselves without providing compa- 
rable liquidity for the nonemployee  shareholder^.^^ The Delaware Supreme 
Court reversed, holding that  the stock-repurchase plans served a legiti- 
mate corporate interest by  maintaining an overlap between employment 
and ownership and that the defendants met the entire fairness standard. 
Plaintiffs claimed that the preferential repurchase of shares was a breach 
of fiduciary duty. The claim raises the question  of the extent to which 
preferential  repurchase  schemes are problematic not solely because the 
price is too high (a version of pure self-dealing) but because they under- 
mine the alignment  of interests between the majority and the minority 
shareholders that makes the form work. There are two aspects to the claim 
here. First, as we  describe in more detail below, to the extent that a high 
density of match assets characterizes close corporations, it becomes very 
difficult for the court to determine whether the repurchase price was en- 
35. Donahue v.  Rodd Electrotype Co., 328 N.E.2d 505 (Mass. 1975). 
36. Nixon v.  Blackwell, 626 A.2d  1366 (Del. 1993). 
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tirely  fair  because  there  is  no market  benchmark.  Second, even  if  one 
could value the shares, the preferential repurchase can be objectionable 
because it undermines  the incentive-compatible lock-in that is the great 
attraction of the legal form. It is these aspects of the problem that lie at 
the heart of both Nixon and Donahue and that are not explicitly discussed 
in either decision. These are very different situations than those that oc- 
curred in case A: they do not raise the intrafirm employment questions 
that made the prior case so difficult. 
But, at the same time, these cases also differ from the classic non pro 
rata distribution of firm assets. Here, the firm receives something of value 
in return for cash: shares of the firm. Normally, under the duty of loyalty, 
transactions between a fiduciary and the firm are not per se void or void- 
able. Rather, they  are judged under  the entire fairness standard and, if 
entirely fair, are valid. 
The question  is  whether  regulating such transactions  is  necessary  to 
supplement the prohibition on non pro rata distributions and, if so, how to 
do so. The dimensions of the problems and the trade-offs among different 
approaches are complex. First, one needs to maintain the beneficial lock- 
in of participants that harnesses the self-interested efforts of the control- 
ling shareholders in  the interests  of  all participants.  Second, one must 
prevent non pro rata distributions, distributions that can be made by the 
advantageous  purchase or sale of  shares. Third, one needs  to maintain 
flexibility in the management of the firm’s capital structure and compensa- 
tion practices. Finally, one needs to provide for the orderly exit of partici- 
pants. 
There are three types  of cases that must  be  accounted for. First, the 
control group may decide to buy out a minority shareholder. In such cases, 
there is little potential for opportunism. Second, the control group may 
decide to buy out a shareholder-employee who is exiting, or has exited, 
the firm, as in both Donahue  v.  Rodrl and Nixon  11.  Blackwell.  Here, the 
potential for opportunism is greater as the control shareholders may pre- 
fer one of their own over outside nonemployee shareholders and there may 
be disguised self-dealing. On the other hand, as continuing shareholder- 
employees, they will  also bear a pro rata  share of the cost. Finally, the 
controlling shareholder sells shares to the firm without giving up control. 
This is the most dangerous circumstance: the controlling shareholder has 
a clear incentive to receive an excessively high price while not giving up 
any of the private benefits of control.’* 
38. A related issue is presented by Kulin  v.  Tremont  Corp., 694 A.2d 422 (Del. 1997). In 
that case, Harold Simmons, the controlling shareholder of Valhi Corp. and, through Valhi, 
of NL Industries, was alleged to have used his control over a third corporation, Tremont, to 
cause Tremont  to buy Valhi-owned shares of NL Industries at an excessively high  price. 
Simmons was able to reduce his holdings in NL, without giving up control, at an allegedly 
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How does the law handle this range of cases? One reading of the law is 
to generalize Donahue v.  Rodd into a general prohibition  on the selective 
buyback of shares in close corporations, that is, an equal opportunity rule. 
This largely eliminates the opportunistic use of buybacks, but at the cost 
of impairing the firm’s flexibility in adjusting its capital structure and com- 
pensation policies and providing exit to shareholders. 
A second possibility is to generalize Nixon  v.  Blackwell into a general 
standard permitting selective stock repurchases whenever they are entirely 
fair. This preserves the firm’s flexibility in compensation and in providing 
exit, but at the cost of diluting the beneficial lock-in. 
A final possibility-which  is plausible-is  that both Donahue  v.  Rodd 
and Nixon  v. Blackwell are correctly decided within  their individual do- 
mains. Nixon addresses one aspect of the more complicated middle cases. 
Note that the Supreme Court’s ruling in Nixon emphasized that the buy- 
back  was  pursuant  to a  long-standing  corporate  policy  to which  the 
minority apparently did not object when first instituted and that the pol- 
icy was adopted to benefit the corporation. Indeed, the Court viewed the 
policy  as a form of deferred compensation that provided  the firm with 
flexibility  to adopt  standard  deferred-compensation  packages  used  in 
other firms to encourage superior employee performance.  Moreover, the 
court emphasized how the policy was applied in an entirely nondiscrimi- 
natory  fashion  among retiring  employees.  By  contrast,  the  Chancery 
Court viewed the policy, not as a deferred-compensation practice, but as 
a straight financial structure issue in which members of the control group 
were given preference over nonemployee shareholders in cashing out. 
As  in  case  A, courts  must  be  careful  not  to confuse  employment- 
relationship  issues  with  straightforward  capital  structure  questions.  If 
courts prevent firms from adopting deferred-compensation  plans because 
of an equal opportunity rule on the exit end, close corporations will not 
be able to develop optimal incentive-based compensation mechanisms. In 
evaluating such cases, courts must look to both the compensation and the 
financial capital aspects of the situation, with particular attention to indi- 
cia of self-dealing. 
Because of the potential for self-dealing when a control group buys out 
one of its own, the entire fairness rule applies. Under entire fairness, the 
Delaware courts look at both fair dealing and fair price. For the Delaware 
Supreme Court, the fact that the stock-purchase plans were adopted for 
legitimate  corporate  purposes (maintaining the overlap between  owner- 
ship and control) and were provided to the shareholder-employees on a 
nondiscriminatory basis established fair dealing. Interestingly, the issue of 
whether the price paid for the shares was excessive did not come up. 
In the close corporation context, both fair price and fair dealing can be 
problematic. Whether a repurchase plan is discriminatory depends on how 
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plan discriminatory  because it did not treat employee and nonemployee 
shareholders  equally.39  By  contrast, the Delaware  Supreme Court could 
have found it nondiscriminatory because it treated all employee sharehold- 
ers equally, although, ultimately, it held that the discrimination against non- 
employee shareholders was j~stifiable.~"  Similarly, relying on fair price is 
problematic when,  as we  discuss in more detail in the next  section, the 
valuation problem is often intractable. 
How,  then, can one understand  Donahue  v.  Rodd  and its relation  to 
Nixon? The primary difference between the two cases is that the control 
group in Donahue was a family group. One worries that the payment to 
Dad is disguised self-dealing, that the more Dad gets for his shares, the 
less the children who work in the business will have to contribute to buy 
him an apartment in Miami. The very family relations that Easterbrook 
and Fischel emphasize as important in reducing agency costs within the 
close corporation increase significantly the potential for self-dealing when 
the family group is dealing with nonfamily shareholders. 
If the existence of a family relationship significantly increases the risks 
of self-dealing, then one can understand  Donahue  1z  Rodd as consistent 
with Nixon. Reading them together, the standard in both is entire fairness, 
a standard not met in Donahue because of a (conclusive) presumption that 
the repurchase was not entirely fair. One can also understand the role of 
equal opportunity  here.  If  adopted by  the control group, it is  powerful 
evidence that the transaction is entirely fair. In Donahue-type cases, offer- 
ing minority  shareholders an equal opportunity to exit reverses the pre- 
sumption that buying back Dad's shares redounds to the sons' individual 
benefit by relieving them of some other financial obligation. 
Appreciate, for a moment, the subtlety of the structure. While the firm 
is  developing  or producing  omelettes  and therefore  has a  reputational 
stake in not breaching  its agreements,  there  are a variety of  structural 
features that align interests, and the principal  legal restriction is no non 
pro rata distributions. This means that the majority shareholder can refuse 
to pay dividends, but only at the cost of all shareholders' capital remaining 
trapped in the firm. This lock-in, plus the other features outlined above, 
provides a strong incentive for the majority shareholder to maximize firm 
value, thereby protecting the minority shareholders' investments as well. 
But the lock-in  is  not absolute. As reconstructed  above, the law  has 
evolved to permit sufficient flexibility to allow the firm selectively to offer 
some shareholders the opportunity to cash out without offering the same 
opportunity to all shareholders when doing so benefits the firm. In doing 
so, the law distinguishes according to the potential for opportunistic be- 
39. Blackwell v.  Nixon, 1991 WL 194725 (Del. Ch. 1991)  at *6. 
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havior by controlling shareholders. Thus, when the firm buys shares from 
noncontrolling shareholders, the business-judgment rule applies. When it 
buys shares from members of the control group who are exiting, the entire 
fairness standard applies, with equal opportunity being powerful evidence 
of entire fairness. Finally, when the firm buys back shares from a control- 
ling shareholder or shareholding family who is remaining in the firm, the 
potential  for self-dealing is so great that entire fairness is  not satisfied 
absent equal ~pportunity.~' 
Once, however, the company enters the last period, defined by the distri- 
bution of a firm's equity capital, the norm against non pro rata distribu- 
tions again protects locked-in minority shareholders. The rule of no non 
pro rata distribution now means that minority shareholders are able to 
cash out at the pro rata valuation. As the majority owner, Major gets to 
define when the omelette is finished and signals that fact by  voiding the 
lock-in, either by dissolution, by merger, or by an initial public offering of 
stock. But, now, Minor gets to exit, either through a pro rata share of the 
firm equity in dissolution, or through an appraisal proceeding if the firm 
is merged into another firm, or by selling out to the market after a public 
offering of shares. 
The rule against non pro rata distributions is the linchpin: it is the rule 
that prevents the participants from jumping out of these channels. So long 
as non pro rata distributions are controlled, remaining problems that arise 
between shareholders can be handled by analogy to employment at will: 
courts should not intervene in the absence of an explicit contract. 
The analysis, then, largely parallels the employment-at-will account. In 
both cases, locking participants  in  to a relationship  in which there are 
substantial investments in match is valuable because it avoids the holdup 
problem (threatening to leave before the omelette is done). It also forces 
the parties to resolve the problems themselves, avoiding defections; pro- 
vides high-powered incentives to succeed; and prevents the parties from 
threatening to impose heavy costs (by threatening expensive litigation) as 
a way of renegotiating the division of the joint surplus. 
In this sense, the principles applied in cases A and B are the same. In 
case A, Minor wants to be cashed out, at least if he cannot continue as an 
employee. In case B,  Major wants to be  cashed out, at least if  he can 
continue in control. On our analysis, the answer is the same in both cases: 
neither can cash out without the other shareholders cashing out to the 
same degree. And, in both cases, the reason is the same: the omelette may 
41.  Paul Mahoney (chap. 6 in this volume) argues for minority exit at will as a default 
setting, using a game-theoretic model. In arriving at his conclusion, Mahoney assumes full 
information and, further, that, on average, courts will be correct in their valuation of closely 
held firms. But, when there is a high density of match assets, neither assumption will likely 
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not be finished yet. Major gets to decide when the omelette is finished, 
but, once Major declares the omelette finished, Minor shares pro rata. 
Meanwhile, neither gets to pull out equity. 
7.4.3  Courts’ Comparative Advantage: Do Cases A and B Differ? 
Our analysis distinguishes sharply between case A and case B. But, say 
some, our distinction misses the point of what the courts are doing in these 
cases and, in particular, why it is important for courts to intervene in case 
A  situation^.^^  The problem,  they  say, is that  courts cannot distinguish 
between market rates of compensation and excessive compensation and 
therefore should and do  protect minority shareholders’ employment in the 
firm as a second-best technique for protecting  their investment  expecta- 
tions. On this view,  unless  you  protect  the expectation  of employment, 
including the expected salary, the financial investment in the firm becomes 
worthless. That is, if pro rata distributions are to be defended, case A must 
be treated  like case B in the sense of judicial intervention to protect the 
minority shareholder. 
But this argument misses the fundamental  reason that courts should 
not and generally do not intervene in employment cases. The argument 
incorrectly assumes that a court is better at distinguishing discharge for 
cause from minority oppression, and, when the remedy is a buyout, calcu- 
lating fair value, than it is at figuring out whether payments by  the firm 
to the majority  shareholder constitute a non pro rata  distribution to a 
shareholder. In fact, because of the presence of significant investments in 
match, exactly the opposite is the case, and the court is likely to be far 
better at policing non pro rata distributions than employment issues. 
Compare the two inquiries.  In case A, the court must first determine 
whether a termination was for cause or, more or less equivalently, for a 
legitimate business  purpose. Having determined  that  a termination was 
unjustified, the court must then either order reinstatement or, more likely, 
given the bad blood between participants, order either dissolution of the 
corporation or a buyout of the minority shareholder at fair value. In either 
case, the court will have to calculate the value of  the firm because, given 
the  presence  of  substantial  investments  in  match,  the  highest-valuing 
buyer in a dissolution will likely be the majority shareholder. 
The first inquiry faces all the problems that have been discussed with 
regard to the employment-at-will  doctrine. Not only is the for-causelfair- 
value  standard a much  harder  standard to apply, but it does not even 
eliminate the need to police  non pro rata distributions.  Even if  an em- 
ployee shareholder has been discharged for cause, so long as he is a share- 
holder, his financial investment in the firm must still be protected against 
such distributions by  the majority. 
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The second inquiry is even worse. If we are correct that the close corpo- 
ration form is most appropriate for firms with substantial investments in 
match, the valuation problem will be intractable: a market valuation will 
be unavailable (because the assets are worth much less to third parties 
than to the participants in the enterprise), and a cash-flow analysis will 
face all the information problems that make it impossible to sell the assets 
to third parties. 
Generally, a company’s assets are valued by first estimating the future 
discounted  stream of the free cash flow that they generate and then at- 
taching a multiple that reflects the discount rate and the risk associated 
with the cash flow. The estimate of free cash flow is based on several fac- 
tors, including the past performance of the company in generating reve- 
nue, the performance of comparable assets in other companies, and the 
market outlook for the products produced by the assets. While this stan- 
dard valuation methodology is adequate for established firms, it does not 
work well in most close corporations because the required data are not 
available. The company may have very limited past performance, the man- 
agement may be too untested to allow reliable future predictions, and the 
company’s products or services may be too novel to allow easy compari- 
sons with seasoned firms. It requires time to determine whether the prod- 
uct ideas will work out and produce free cash flow of any given size. 
Indeed, the difficulties of valuing the assets of the close corporation are, 
at least in the Silicon Valley context, an important explanation for why the 
company continues to be privately held. By  the time enough information 
is available on likely performance to value the match assets of the close 
corporation, it is time for the close corporation to go public. Similarly, for 
firms furthest from access to a public market, the valuation problems are 
the greatest. Take, for example, the classic mom and pop. Where mom and 
pop are the enterprise,  it is difficult to distinguish  any ongoing market 
value from the value provided by the principals. The enterprise’s match 
assets may be so tied to mom and pop that no independent valuation can 
be attributed to the firm’s other assets. Moreover, in this case, generating 
additional years of performance data will not bring the firm closer to a 
reliable market valuation. Valuing the firm by looking at the sale value 
of comparable firms would  also be stymied by  the distinctiveness  of the 
enterprise and the difficulty identifying comparables. Finally, when com- 
parable companies can be found, one’s confidence in the resulting valua- 
tions would be challenged by the thinness of the market. 
By contrast, consider the judicial inquiry under the norm of no non pro 
rata distributions in case B. First, insofar as the claim is one of a failure to 
pay dividends, the inquiry is straightforward: as long as no one is receiving 
dividends,  so long as the earnings are retained in the corporation,  the 
court can defer to the discretion of the board, knowing that everyone’s 
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Second, consider the manifold varieties  of basic self-dealing,  ranging 
from excessive salaries, to non pro rata dividends, to diversion of corpo- 
rate opportunities, to sales to or purchases from the corporation. This is 
the classic domain of the duty of loyalty. The basic principle, here, is that 
the majority shareholder will bear the burden of establishing entire fair- 
ness, where entire  fairness is defined with reference to an unconflicted arm’s- 
length transaction. 
Consider salaries as an example, although the analysis applies equally 
to other transactions with the corporation. The standard is a market stan- 
dard: Are  the controlling  shareholders receiving more than the market 
wage? When, as is often the case, the controlling  shareholders  set their 
own salary, standard corporate  law  analysis imposes the  burden  of  es- 
tablishing entire fairness on the controlling shareholders, that is, showing 
that the wage is at or below the comparable market level. While plaintiffs 
typically fail in challenges to dividend policy or employment policy, they 
apparently  fare  substantially  better  in challenges  to excessive compen- 
o at ion.^' 
Moreover, courts have already had experience in determining, in the tax 
context,  whether  close corporation  salaries are excessive.44  When  there 
were tax advantages to paying dividends as above-market salary, the IRS 
scrutinized such payments on precisely this basis. As the tax preference 
for distributions in salary disappears, determining whether a salary meets 
the market test is likely to be easier because relevant benchmarks will be 
less distorted. 
In addition, the courts have at their disposal their traditional methods 
of shaping the decision process by allocating burdens of proof. Thus, the 
courts will be more deferential to salaries that are set by independent out- 
side directors than by the majority shareholders themselves. Interestingly, 
for example, the problem of diversion of profits to majority shareholders 
through excessive salaries seems nonexistent  in  the Silicon Valley high- 
tech context, in part at least because managers’ salaries are set by,  or at 
least in consultation with, the venture capitalists. 
While judicial intervention  in case A forces courts to value the firm, 
with the associated problems created by the high density of match-specific 
assets, no such difficulties bedevil case B. In the salary context, the ques- 
tion is whether a salary is excessive relative to market equivalents. In the 
context of other transactions with the firm, the issue is likewise whether 
43. Donahue at n. 15: “Attacks on allegedly excessive salaries voted for officers and direc- 
tors fare better in the courts. . . . What is ‘reasonable compensation’ is a question offact. . . . 
The proof which establishes an excess over such ‘reasonable compensation’ appears easier 
than the proof which would establish bad faith or plain abuse of discretion.” See also Ahsku 
P[ustics v.  Coppork, 621  P.2d  270  (Alaska 1980); and  Crosby  v.  Beurn,  548 N.E.2d  217 
(Ohio 1989). 
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the terms of the transaction  between  the majority shareholder and the 
firm meet the market test. In the case of dividends, the question is only 
whether all shareholders receive the same amount. 
Indeed, the only times the court must enter the thicket of valuing the 
firm are when the firm is being sold (by a merger or a sale of  assets, in 
some jurisdictions)  and the minority  shareholders request  appraisal  or 
when there is a selective stock repurchase. In the case of an arm’s-length 
merger, the shareholders have the opportunity to receive the same consid- 
eration as the majority shareholder but believe that their shares are worth 
more. But, in those circumstances, precisely because the firm is being sold, 
there is at least one measure of valuation available. Moreover, because all 
shareholders share equally in the proceeds of a sale or dissolution,  the 
majority shareholder is likely to represent  the interests  of the minority 
shareholders. Major is unlikely to sell the firm unless it has reached the 
stage where its third-party  value is beginning to approach  the value to 
the  participant^.^^ As discussed earlier, selective stock repurchases present 
genuinely difficult issues. 
The focus on preventing non pro rata distributions points the way to- 
ward incremental modifications within the existing framework to increase 
the level of enforcement without entering the for-cause thickets, without 
disturbing the employment-at-will standard, and without judicial valua- 
tion.  For example,  once it is clear that  the issue is preventing non pro 
rata distributions, the courts should make it easier to challenge contracts 
between  the controlling  shareholder  and the firm.  Consider  Crosby  v. 
Beam, in which the majority  shareholders entered into self-dealing con- 
tracts  with  the firm,  including  unreasonable  salaries,  use  of  corporate 
property, life insurance, low-interest loans, and so forth.46  The legal issue 
was whether  the minority  shareholders must challenge the  agreements 
through a derivative suit, which is subject to the demand requirement and 
in which any recovery is paid into the corporate treasury, or whether the 
minority shareholders could bring a direct suit. After a long discussion of 
how, in a close corporation, the majority shareholders owe fiduciary duties 
to the minority shareholders, the court held that the suit could be brought 
as a direct suit, with recovery going directly to the plaintiffs: “Given the 
foregoing, if we require a minority shareholder in a close corporation, who 
alleges that  the majority  shareholders breached  their fiduciary duty to 
him, to institute an action pursuant to Civ. R. 23.1,  then any recovery 
would accrue to the corporation and remain under the control of the very 
parties who are defendants in the litigation. Thus, a derivative remedy is not 
45. A more difficult problem arises when it is the majority shareholder who is buying out 
the minority shares. Under these circumstances, the court has no choice but to enter the 
difficult problem of valuation, and, although it can and does seek to avoid the difficult valua- 
tion questions by  encouraging the use of independent  negotiating structures to mimic an 
arm’s-length sale, its success in doing so is only limited. 
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an effective remedy because the wrongdoers would be the principal benefi- 
ciaries of the recovery. See, generally, 2 O’Neal’s Close Corporations, at 
120-123  section 8.1 1.” 
According to our analysis, the court got it half right. The fact that the 
majority is accused of engaging in a self-interested  transaction with the 
firm is, of course, central and, in a derivative suit, would fully justify excus- 
ing demand as obviously  futile and allowing the plaintiff to proceed  di- 
rectly to the merits of the action. But, if the guiding principle is preserving 
the beneficial lock-in effect of corporate form against attempts at non pro 
rata distributions,  then the right result is that any excessive payments go 
back into the corporation, where they remain locked up until the majority 
chooses to make some sort of pro rata distribution. This is an adjustment 
to the procedural requirement for derivative suits in the light of the special 
nature of close corporations (or, perhaps, simply an application), but it is 
a quite different  sort of adjustment  than that adopted by  the Ohio Su- 
preme Court. 
Along  the  same lines, an appreciation  of  the  central  issue will  lead 
courts to give less deference to the board of directors in setting its own 
compensation or in approving asset distributions of other sorts. Finally, it 
makes it clear that, in the absence of some independent decision maker, 
the burden  of proof  falls on the majority shareholder to justify  salaries 
and other payments as entirely fair. 
7.4.4  Case C: Is the Sale of Control for a Premium 
a Non Pro Rata Distribution? 
In the close corporation, we  take the rule of no non pro rata distribu- 
tions to have the status of a commandment. It is the principle that makes 
the whole thing work, that allows minority shareholders to rely on major- 
ity shareholders to manage the firm in the general shareholder interest. It 
is this principle that allows for optimal investment in match-specific assets. 
Finally, enforcing this principle frees the courts from having to enter on 
the impossible (and destructive) tasks of  sorting out, on the one hand, 
whether  a discharge of a minority shareholder-employee was for cause 
and, on the other, how much the firm is worth. 
What, then, does one make of case C, in which Major sells its majority 
block to a third party who is unwilling to buy the minority shares on equal 
terms? Under U.S. corporate law, the general common law rule is that the 
majority shareholder may sell its holdings, and a buyer may buy its hold- 
ings, without offering the minority shareholders an opportunity to partici- 
pate.47  The principal exception is when the majority or controlling share- 
holder  has reason  to believe that  the buyer  will  loot the corp~ration.~~ 
47. See, e.g., Zetlin 1:  Hunson Holdings, 397 N.E.2d 387 (N.Y. 1979). 
48. Scc, e.g., Gerdes v  Reynolds 28 N.Y.S.2d 622 (Sup. Ct., Spec. Term 1941) Match-Specific Assets and Minority Oppression  235 
There are a few cases to the contrary,  but this is the general rule (see, 
generally, Elhauge 1992). Much has been written on the efficiency of com- 
peting rules governing sales of control. We cannot enter that thicket here 
but must address the relation between  sales of control and non pro rata 
distributions and, more generally, the connection between sales of control 
and firms with heavy match investments. 
Case C seems to be an interesting and difficult mix of cases A and B: 
when the majority shareholder sells control, he thereby terminates his rela- 
tionship with the firm while taking a larger than pro rata share of firm 
value. On its face, the majority shareholder’s sale might seem to violate 
the no non pro rata  distribution norm or, at the very least, the related 
norm governing endgames. When a majority shareholder sells its block, it 
gets cash at a time when the other shareholders do not. Moreover, the 
minority shareholders  cannot even check the effect of the sale on their 
share of  the presale  equity of  the firm.  Finally, unlike an arm’s-length 
merger or dissolution, in which the shareholders share on an equal basis, 
often with a right of appraisal, here the minority shareholders not only do 
not share but also have no right to appraisal. In short, we worry that the 
majority shareholders will sell out the minority shareholders in the process 
of selling control. As before, we  worry about this prospect  to the extent 
that  it  undermines  the  minority  shareholders’  willingness  to invest  in 
match-specific assets, thereby reducing the parties’ joint surplus. 
Yet the situations also seem quite different. The sale of a majority block 
differs from the non pro rata payment of dividends, for example, in several 
important respects. First, the sale of the blocks results in a change of con- 
trol, while the various non pro rata distributions leave the incumbent con- 
troller in place. Second, the new controller steps into the shoes of the old 
controller, with  all the same restrictions  on non pro rata  distributions, 
restrictions that, suggests the work of Holderness and Sheehan (chap. 5 in 
this volume), may be surprisingly effective. Third, to sell a majority block, 
one needs to find a buyer, which imposes a barrier that is not present in 
non pro rata distributions. 
Indeed, in form at least, there is no difference between Major selling his 
shares to a new Major and any Minor selling its shares to a new Minor, 
except perhaps the amount received for the shares, There is, indeed, an 
active market for shares of closely held Silicon Valley start-ups, in which 
(sophisticated) minority  shareholders sell their shares to other (sophisti- 
cated) investors pursuant to rule 144A.49 
Why might minority shareholders, ex ante, agree to permit the majority 
shareholder to sell its block without an equal opportunity rule, despite the 
extent to which it may be in tension with the beneficial lock-in and the 
principle of no non pro rata distributions? This old chestnut of corporate 
49. Securities Act of 1933. rule 144A (“Private Resales of Securities to Institutions”), 17 
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law looks somewhat different  against the backdrop  of our emphasis on 
match investments. Take again, as given, that the close corporation is char- 
acterized by a large percentage of match assets. Moreover, assume that the 
lock-in of the corporate form, with exit at the close of play, is part of what 
renders the form incentive compatible. 
The principal concern with permitting sales of a majority block is that 
the buyer and seller may collude to impose additional costs on third par- 
ties, here, the minority  shareholders. Absent third-party effects, one can 
trust the buyer and seller to figure out what is best for them.s0 So long as 
the constraints on private benefits of control are reasonably binding, the 
likelihood of third-party effects is small, and one can leave it to the buyer 
and seller of control to negotiate terms.s1  In such cases, the seller will sell 
only if  the buyer  is  better  at managing  the corporation than the seller, 
which will benefit the minority. Indeed, because of the difficulties in valua- 
tion, the buyer will likely have to be substantially better than the seller. 
The key point in the close corporation context is that private benefits of 
control are restrained by a set of formal and informal sanctions. For ex- 
ample, suppose that the trapped minority believes that, through one mech- 
anism or another, the planned sale will itself diminish the value of its in- 
vestment. One remedy is to sue for a breach of the duty of loyalty. Whether 
or not the minority wins, such suits raise a red flag for any diligent new 
person thinking of becoming a controller. The reaction of the potential 
buyer is now threefold. First, he doubles the due diligence concerning the 
information provided by the majority. Presumably, the disgruntled frozen- 
in person might even be helpful here in supplying information. Second, 
the potential entrant may think twice about buying into a close corpora- 
tion where the minority is disgruntled.  In some circumstances,  this may 
lead the buyer to insist on buying 100 percent. Third, the buyer may react 
by  a standard “curse on both their houses”  and choose to pull his bid 
entirely or to bargain hard to buy the controller’s share at a cheap price. 
In brief, because of  limited  numbers, the parties can hurl mud  at each 
other with great accuracy. 
Another consideration figures in as well: the orderly exit of controllers. 
Sometimes,  the  majority  shareholder  gets  tired  of  being  the  majority 
shareholder or knows that he has lost his effectiveness. Sometimes, also, 
50. One might also worry that the exiting controller is selling a lemon and that the entering 
controller does not know that. But, even if this occurs, the minority is no worse off, just as 
badly off  as before.  Moreover, this should not be a likely event. Those who buy into an 
existing close corporation are, in general, likely to be highly diligent. Indeed, they are likely 
to be more careful than the controller who entered at the outset. 
51. This is the core of Elhauge’s (1992) channeling explanation for existing doctrine: the 
looting cases (highly liquid assets, big premium) identify those cases in which the likelihood 
of collusion between buyer and seller is highest; the free sale cases, by contrast, are situations 
in which it is difficult for buyer and seller to collude successfully, either because of the nature 
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the firm is not yet ready to be sold to a third party because the omelette 
is not yet cooked. How do you make sure that there is someone around to 
play the role of majority shareholder, with all its burdens and risks? The 
common law  answer may be the legal equivalent to the informal rule in 
voluntary organizations that you cannot stop chairing a committee until 
you find a replacement. Because the omelette is not finished, it will be very 
difficult to convince a third party to take over the omelette business, and 
it may be that the majority shareholder may have to take a substantial 
discount in order to induce a third party to take over. In such cases, the 
minority shareholders are beneficiaries, not because the buyer will  have 
bribed the controller to leave, but because the controller has bribed the 
new controller to enter.52 
If this is more or less right, then, so long as the prohibition on non pro 
rata  distributions is reasonably well  enforced,  the incentive-compatible 
rule in the close corporation context is the same as in the public corpora- 
tion context, namely, that, absent a shareholders’ agreement to the con- 
trary, any shareholder, majority or minority, is free to sell to whomever is 
willing to buy (except a looter). The buyer, majority or minority, steps into 
the shoes of the seller and is locked in to the same extent. 
This means that, in the articulation of the pro rata principle, one must 
emphasize that it applies to distributions. On this view, the control on di- 
versions of the cash flow does most of the work. Indeed, this may support 
Elhauge’s (1992) argument that the laissez-faire rule is most appropriate 
for those situations or, more generally, those systems in which non pro 
rata  distributions are sharply  limited, while  the equal opportunity rule 
may better fit those situations in which such distributions are badly con- 
trolled. 
7.4.5  Minority Shareholders’ Information Rights 
In the earlier discussion, we discourage judicial intervention in cases A 
and C.  In both cases, however, there are potential problems with respect 
to  the  minority’s  access  to  company  information  that,  if  addressed, 
strengthen our case. Recall the argument suggested in Wilkes: once Minor 
is terminated, the underlying asymmetry of information will make it un- 
tenable to continue as a minority shareholder. This is an important argu- 
ment  as we  have argued that the asymmetry of information associated 
52. The difficulty  of valuation may enter in another way.  Because the omelette is only 
partly cooked, it would be extremely difficult for a court to determine whether the selling 
majority shareholder got too much, whether he was paid a “premium” for control. This may 
be  the reason  that courts focus on preventing non pro rata distributions rather than on 
measuring the extent to which the majority shareholder was overpaid. But, of course, a rule 
preventing a majority shareholder from selling control for a premium need not involve judi- 
cial valuation: an equal opportunity rule would be as easily implemented here as it was in 
the WiNces case. 238  Edward B. Rock and Michael L. Wachter 
with a high density of match-specific  investments is part of what makes 
the  close  corporation  form  appropriate  and  that  the overlap  between 
shareholders and managers helps manage that asymmetry of information. 
On the one hand, it may be  that  this untenability  is optimal for the 
parties, under the circumstances. Both the high-tech sector and the tradi- 
tional close corporation sector show that mandatory provisions that pro- 
vide for the buyback  of employee shares on termination of employment 
at either cost or book value (easily measured amounts that are often far 
below actual, pro rata value) are quite common. 
But, as the case  B cases indicate, it is  not  always the case that it is 
untenable  to be a minority nonemployee shareholder. Whether,  and the 
extent to which, such a position may be tenable depends, in part, on the 
extent to which the courts police the norm of non pro rata distributions. 
This, in turn, depends on the extent to which courts provide for and en- 
force minority rights to information. Like the enforcement of the norm 
against non pro rata distributions, enforcing minority information  rights 
protects the beneficial characteristics of the close corporate form without 
dragging the courts into either adjudicating employment-at-will issues or 
firm valuation. 
To operate effectively, however, Minor must know when Major is acting 
opportunistically.  Minor,  as either  a  shareholder-employee  or a share- 
holder,  has the ability to impose or threaten  Major with informal  sanc- 
tions. When Minor is employed, he has all the normal methods of sanction 
that apply to an employee. In his role as a shareholder in a closely held 
company, Minor also holds considerable power to impose sanctions. But, 
if Minor is either discharged from the company or left employed but in a 
nonmanagerial capacity, he is unlikely to obtain the requisite information 
needed to know when and how to act. 
Minority shareholder information rights come from two sources: state 
law and federal law. Under state law, shareholders are entitled to substan- 
tial information. Delaware corporate law provides that “any stockholder, 
in person or by attorney or other agent, shall, upon written demand under 
oath stating the purpose thereof, have the right during the usual hours for 
business to inspect for any proper purpose the corporation’s stock ledger, 
a list of its stockholders,  and its other books and records, and to make 
copies or extracts therefrom. A proper purpose shall mean a purpose rea- 
sonably  related  to such  person’s interest  as a  stockholder.”j3 As  inter- 
preted, Delaware section 220 provides minority shareholders of the close 
corporation substantial rights to information. First, “in the case of a close 
corporation, inspection rights will be liberally construed in favor of a mi- 
nority  stockholder”  (Welch  and  Turezyn  1993,  sec.  220.6.3,  p.  466). 
53. Del. GCL, sec. 220. Minority shareholders have similar information rights under the 
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Second, finding out the facts necessary to determine whether Major is en- 
gaging in self-dealing, or mismanagement,  or both, is clearly a “proper 
purpose”  under  section  220  (Welch  and  Turezyn  1993,  sec.  220.6.3, 
p. 466).54 
The federal securities laws provide  the second principal  source of in- 
formation rights for minority shareholders. Although close corporations 
are not subject  to the periodic-disclosure  obligations,  section  10(b) of 
the Securities Exchange Act and rule lob-5 apply fully.55  Rule  lob-5 has 
proved most important in endgame scenarios. Minor, who is terminating 
his relationship with the firm, negotiates to sell his shares back to the firm 
or to the majority shareholder. At the same time, unbeknownst to Minor, 
Major is engaged in serious discussions with a potential acquirer of the 
firm or with an investment banker who wishes to take the firm public. 
Sometime after Minor sells his shares, the acquisition is announced, plac- 
ing a value on the firm far in excess of what Minor received. Minor sues, 
alleging that, had he known of the merger discussions, he would not have 
sold his shares. In such circumstances,  the courts have held  that, when 
Major is buying out Minor, Major has a duty to disclose all material non- 
public  information,  including  negotiations  to  sell  the  firm  or take  it 
public.S6 
This structure fits well with  our previous  analysis. Like  the vigorous 
enforcement of the norm against non pro rata distributions, so, too, the 
enforcement of these information rights protects the incentive compatibil- 
ity of the close corporation form. The state law rights to information help 
alleviate (although clearly not eliminate) the underlying asymmetry of in- 
formation while Minor is a shareholder. Major’s duty under lob-5 to dis- 
close material  facts or abstain from buying Minor’s shares protects and 
reinforces  the endgame  norm: on liquidation  or merger,  shareholders 
share equally.57 
54.  In addition, minority  shareholders who are in litigation with the corporation have 
substantial rights to information under the civil discovery rules, whether in  federal or in 
state court. 
55. Under rule 10b-5, “It shall be unlawful for any person  . . . (a) to employ any device, 
scheme, or artifice to defraud, (b) to make any untrue statement of a material fact or to omit 
to state a material fact necessary in order to make the statements made, in the light of the 
circumstances  under which they were made, not misleading, or (c) to engage in any act, prac- 
tice, or course of business which operates or would operate as a fraud or deceit upon any 
person, in connection with the purchase or sale of any security” (17 C.F.R., sec. 240.10b-5). 
On the applicability of  lob-5 to close corporations, even in the sale of the entire business, 
see Landreth Timber Co. v.  Landreth, 471 U.S. 681 (1985). 
56. See, e.g., Rochez  v.  Rhoades, 527 E2d 880 (3d Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 425 U.S. 993 
(1976); Thomas v. Durulite Co., 524 E2d 577 (3d Cir. 1975); Michaels v.  Michaels, Michaels 
and Hymun-Michaels, 767 F.2d  1185, 1194-97 (7th Cir. 1985); and Homes v.  Buteson, 583 
E2d 542, 558 (1st Cir. 1978). 
57. An  additional set of issues arises when  Minor is  subject to a mandatory buyback 
provision on termination of his relationship with the corporation. The issue arises whether 
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7.5  Conclusion 
The close corporation form is ideally suited to enterprises in which there 
is a high density of match-specific  assets. The limitations on exit, com- 
bined with the rule against non pro rata distributions, largely prevent op- 
portunistic behavior by the majority shareholder toward the minority. By 
locking both into the enterprise, the majority shareholders, in maximizing 
their own wealth, will, to a large extent, also maximize the wealth of the 
minority. Indeed, many of the persistent features of close corporations can 
best be understood  as self-enforcing mechanisms  to protect the partici- 
pants from misbehavior by fellow participants. 
This is not to say that all enterprises that use the close corporation form 
make use of these attributes. An important result of this paper is that, by 
isolating the distinctive features of close corporations, we  identify those 
enterprises that are best suited for the close corporation form. The enter- 
prises that most value the lock-in are precisely those Silicon Valley start- 
ups with  new  products that  need  time  to set. In its best  use, the close 
corporation  thus serves as an incubator for tomorrow’s publicly owned 
corporations. 
For close corporations without intensive match investments,  the costs 
of the lock-in may well exceed the benefits. For such corporations, there 
are two obvious alternatives. First, they can retain the close corporation 
form and allow minority exit in the articles of incorporation. Alternatively, 
they  can choose  other  organizational  forms,  such  as partnership,  that 
allow exit at will as a default. We argue against a third alternative-case- 
by-case adjudication based on a finding that the minority’s reasonable ex- 
pectations  have been  defeated.  Gap filling in this context  suffers badly 
because of the great likelihood  of judicial error given the difficulties of 
first evaluating claims of defeated expectations and then, when necessary, 
valuing match investments. 
whether to terminate his relationship with the firm (Jordun v.  Duff & Phelps, 815 E2d 429 
[7th Cir.  19871; Smith v.  Duffund Phelps, 891 E2d 1567 [l  lth Cir. 19901). A related issue is 
whether such a mandatory buyback provision should be read to displace the employment- 
at-will presumption in the employment relationship. The answer has been negative (see, e.g., 
Ingle u.  Giamore Motor Sales, Inc., 73 N.Y.2d  183 [N.Y. Ct. App. 19891 [mandatory buyback 
provision does not get shareholder-employee any protection against at-will discharge]). In- 
deed, in some cases, the buyback provisions explicitly provide that “nothing herein contained 
shall confer on the Employee any right to be continued in the employment of the Corpora- 
tion” (Jordan u.  Duff& Phelps, 815 E2d at 446). Finally, the question also arises whether the 
firm can fire an employee simply in order to trigger the mandatory buyback provision (Gal- 
lagher  v.  Lumbert, 549 N.E.2d  136 [N.Y.  19891 [no breach of fiduciary duty to terminate 
minority shareholder triggering mandatory buyback even if firing is motivated by desire to 
take advantage of lower valuation]; Knudsen  v.  Northwest  Airlines, 450 N.W.2d  131 [Minn. 
19901 [stock-option agreement that expires when employee ceases to work for employer does 
not imply any covenant of good-faith termination for cause]; cf. Jordan v. Duff& Phelps, 815 
E2d at 439 [Easterbrook] with 815 E2d at 446 [Posner, dissenting]). While these issues are 
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After examining the extent to which the enterprise form itself constrains 
opportunistic behavior by participants, we analyzed the classic problem(s) 
of minority oppression in the close corporation. As we understand it, mi- 
nority oppression can best be understood as a combination of two sepa- 
rate and separable problems. The first aspect, captured in case A, is  a 
version of precisely the same problem that, in employment law, arises un- 
der the heading employment at will:  the situation in which Major termi- 
nates Minor’s employment. Here, we  showed that, by  adopting the same 
passive stance as it does in the employment context, the law avoids threat- 
ening and undermining the self-enforcing structure in place. 
The second aspect of the problem, captured in case B, is fundamentally 
different from employment at will and involves attempts by Major to make 
non pro rata distributions of company assets. Here, we showed that vigor- 
ous judicial enforcement of a prohibition on such distributions, including 
the vigorous protection of ancillary rights to information, is necessary to 
enforce norms of nonopportunism. We  further  showed that courts are 
much better at sorting out issues of this sort than they are at sorting out 
employment-at-will type issues because doing so does not require either 
relying on unverifiable factors or valuing assets that the courts cannot 
value. 
Out of our appreciation of the beauty of  the close corporation come 
several conclusions. First, our analysis implies that the parties themselves, 
rather than the courts, are best able to resolve the nasty employment issues 
that animate many bitter close corporation cases. Second, the analysis in- 
dicates that vigorous judicial enforcement of the sacred norm against non 
pro rata distributions is necessary to block the attempts of majority share- 
holders to profit from self-dealing transactions with the corporation. Fi- 
nally, with an expanded menu of  enterprise forms, there is little cost in 
allowing the close corporation to maintain its distinctive qualities. Firms 
that are not waiting for omelettes to set can choose another form that 
allows easy exit of capital suppliers. 
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COInmeIIt  Vikas Mehrotra 
The organization of economic enterprises has its own rainbow coalition 
of followers: legal scholars, economists and historians of all hues, organi- 
zation theorists, even sociologists and behaviorists, all with their own pe- 
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culiar slants on the issue. The central question, however, remains common: 
Why do we  observe the prevalence  of certain forms of business  organi- 
zation  in  certain  activities?  In  their  paper,  Edward  Rock  and Michael 
Wachter focus on the close corporation and its peculiarities vis-a-vis other, 
possibly  competitive,  forms of  organization. What advantages  are con- 
ferred by the close corporation on its main protagonists? What features of 
the close corporation deserve scrutiny? 
The answer to the first question is made obvious by the authors’ choice 
of title. There is an omelette in the making. The eggs and hardware have 
been financed by a venture capitalist (VC), and the chef is exercising her 
skills to prepare the omelette. There are strong incentives for both parties 
to remain locked in until the omelette is done since there appears to be 
no market for partially done omelettes.  Both the VC and the chef have 
considerable match-specific investments in the omelette, and, therefore, an 
abiding interest in seeing it through to completion. This is the essence of 
the  argument  favoring the close  corporate  form  over  other  alternative 
forms. 
For example, the limited partnership, with its ease of exit and dissolu- 
tion, would not suit the locked-in nature of this relationship. On sensing 
a particularly  well-done  omelette, the controlling  partner can force the 
noncontrolling partner to relinquish a large portion of the gains from the 
enterprise. It does not matter, ex post, that the product of the enterprise 
required joint input. Ease of exit provides grounds for a credible holdup 
threat. 
What about the open corporation? The open corporate form is charac- 
terized by diffuse ownership and easy transferability of equity shares and 
would require enormous resources to provide periodic updates as to the 
status of the omelette. These costs render the open corporate form unsuit- 
able for ventures characterized by a high degree of information asymmetry 
between capital providers and managers. Moreover, it is not clear whether 
the open corporation, with diffuse ownership, can overcome the free-rider 
problem of monitoring the omelette-making process. The close corporate 
form overcomes both these limitations: it discourages easy dissolution and 
maintains the identities of the ex ante contracting parties at least until the 
omelette is done. 
So far, this is familiar  territory.  Studies by  Telser (1980),  Klein  and 
Leffler (198 l), and Williamson (1983) have made important contributions 
to the literature on corporate form and self-enforcing contracts. The main, 
and perhaps unsurprising, message in these studies is that contracts re- 
main self-enforcing until one of the parties finds it in its interest to quit, 
with the only penalty being the voiding of the contract and, naturally, all 
attendant future benefits. In fact, form is dictated primarily  by  the cost 
of contracting. Whereas market transactions are suitable for exchanging 
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specificity and frequency of exchange increase. However, there are other 
determinants of self-enforcing contracts as well. In particular, as pointed 
out by Barzel (1982), the measurement cost of information plays a role in 
determining the extent of the holdup problem created when two parties 
lock in to a contract. This simple observation brings us to the two features 
related to minority protection of the close corporation-employment  at 
will and restrictions on non pro rata distributions-highlighted  by  Rock 
and Wachter. 
Obviously, providing ex ante minority protection benefits the majority 
(the controlling party) since, absent such protection, the minority party 
would either demand higher compensation or not enter into the contract 
at all. Rock and Wachter argue that the employment-at-will feature in the 
close corporation should be treated with the same passivity as is the norm 
in regular employee-employer  relationships.  They correctly point  to the 
onerous measurement  costs of untangling employee dismissal cases. The 
argument that malicious or arbitrary dismissals inhibit formation of VC- 
financed start-ups suffers from two main problems. 
First, it ignores the role of reputation in curbing opportunistic behav- 
ior by  the VC. Most VCs intend to hang around only until the start-up 
is taken public (allowing them to cash out); thus, VC  wealth is the dis- 
counted value  of the VC’s  association with all future start-ups. To  wit, 
capturing an unfair share of one omelette must therefore be judged against 
the expected present worth of thefair  share of all future omelettes. Sec- 
ond, even if such an equation is violated (owing to malice, which must be 
economically irrational to make the point), the courts will find it extremely 
costly to untangle the mess of allegations and counterallegations that fre- 
quently characterize such malice-inspired dismissals. Judicial services have 
their bottom lines, too. 
Breach  of another kind is treated differently in the view of Rock and 
Wachter. Non pro rata distributions transfer wealth from the minority to 
majority and, if left unchecked, will increase the contracting cost of start- 
ups. In what sense is this manner of oppression different from employment 
at will? After all, employment at will also confers the opportunity to trans- 
fer wealth  in a way  that violates ex  ante rules of sharing. The arbitrary 
dismissal is a way  to precipitate  non pro rata distribution of corporate 
resources,  insofar  as the dismissed  party  is denied  its share of  the dis- 
counted worth of corporate profits. So, obviously, non pro rata distribu- 
tions must refer to specific forms of denials and distributions. And herein 
lies the rub: how to discriminate  among the various  forms of non pro 
rata distributions? 
The big contribution of this paper is that the proscription  on non pro 
rata distributions is an outcome of the ease of documentation and presen- 
tation  of evidence. To  be sure, the honesty  equation  that cements  self- 
enforcing contracts applies to non pro rata distributions as well. However, Match-Specific Assets and Minority Oppression  245 
breaches can now be examined by  the courts in a cost-efficient manner. 
Furthermore, whereas firing an entrepreneur-manager also relieves the VC 
of the entrepreneur’s skills, non pro rata distributions, within limits and 
excluding malicious cases, need not bring the venture to a stop. Indeed, a 
rational VC will engage in non pro rata distributions to extract only the 
quasi rents from the venture, leaving just enough on the plate for the mi- 
nority party to offset her external opportunities, as opposed to grabbing 
the entire omelette. Clearly, court intervention in these cases would raise 
the cost of such opportunistic behavior and lower the ex ante cost of con- 
tracting  between the VC  and the minority party. But, returning to the 
question posed in the last paragraph, what particular  forms of non pro 
rata distributions qualify for judicial intervention? 
Self-dealing transactions by the majority party with the firm are an ob- 
vious candidate that merit court-ordered protection for the simple reason 
that these cases are relatively simple to document. For example, cash divi- 
dends that accrue only to the majority shareholder are typically forbidden. 
So are interfirm transactions that are carried out at nonmarket prices. But 
what if the VC owns preferred shares with deferred coupons whereas the 
minority party owns common shares with no contractual dividends? As 
long as the coupon rate on the preferred shares is well specified in advance, 
this poses no problems. Examination of non pro rata distributions must 
therefore  be  restricted  to  unanticipated  events.  This  point  is  implied 
throughout by the authors, but not explicitly stated. 
What about transactions where the majority sells its shares to another 
party, without involving the minority in the sale? In my view, such transac- 
tions can easily be contracted out of at the start of the relationship. The 
absence of such protection does not create an unanticipated event. If, in its 
assessment, the minority party feels that the risk of such control changes is 
large, it could either ask for a negative covenant prohibiting such sales 
or receive a larger ex ante compensation package. The courts should not 
interfere with control changes for the same reasons that it should intervene 
in self-dealing transactions: the former are easy to restrict in ex ante con- 
tracts, while the set of self-dealing transactions is so large and varied that 
a comprehensive ex ante contract prohibiting such actions would be costly 
to write. 
Overall, the paper makes an important contribution to our understand- 
ing of the close corporation, beginning with a clear rationale for the exis- 
tence of this form of organization in certain sectors of the economy, such 
as the Silicon Valley start-up, and highlighting two features of minority 
oppression in the close corporation. The authors rightly argue that the 
courts maintain their passivity in employment-at-will cases and vigorously 
enforce non pro rata distributions of corporate resources. The arguments 
are built mainly on the cost of using judicial intervention to correct viola- 
tions of ex ante sharing rules. 246  Edward B. Rock and Michael L. Wacliter 
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